MŪLA-MADHYAMAKA-KĀRIKĀ

OF

NĀGĀRJUNA

[CHAPTERS I-V]

PART I

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यस्य प्रेरणया मतिर्नयविदः सम्बोधिता मामकी
श्रीनागार्जुनतन्त्रमर्मविवृतौ तस्मिन् सिते कर्म्मणि।
उत्सृष्टं निजतृप्तयेऽद्य विबुधालङ्कारहीरस्य भोः
गौरीनाथ! करारविन्दयुगले तत् सादरं तस्य ते॥

PREFACE

After great hesitation I embarked on the venture of presenting before students of Buddhist Philosophy, the translations of the Madhyamaka Kārikās of Nāgārjuna. The text of Nāgārjuna on Mādhyamika Philosophy is not now available in printed form. The present attempt professes to be no more than mere translation of the Kārikās in the light of the commentary of Candrakīrti. I am fully conscious of the limitations of an ordinary student like me and I must humbly admit that the book cannot claim to be as exhaustive as it should have been.

In this part of the book translations of first five chapters have been presented and I propose to publish the rest in my subsequent parts.

It is for me a matter of great pleasure to say that in writing this book, I received help from Dr. Nalināksa Dutt M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt. Head of the Dept. of Pāli, Calcutta University, Pt. Ananta Kumar Tarkatīrtha, Professor of Indian Philosophy, Sanskrit College, Dr. Anukul Chandra Banerjee, M.A., Ph.D. Reader in Pāli, Calcutta University and Prof. Krishna Gopal Goswāmī, M.A., P.R.S. Reader in Sanskrit, Calcutta University.

I must acknowledge the inspiration that I have drawn at every stage from my reverend teacher Dr. Gaurīnātha Śāstrī, M.A., P.R.S., D.Litt., to whom the humble work is respectfully dedicated.

Sanskrit College,
Calcutta,
1st December, 1957

HERAMBA NATH CHATTERJEE

INTRODUCTION

Buddhism, that wonderful teaching which declares life to be sorrow and yet is free from pessimism, which apparently inculcates the profoundest egoism and yet is charged with the loftiest morality, which denies the 'I' the soul and yet teaches absolute responsibility of our own deeds through rebirth, which is without God or prayer and yet offers the most certain salvation, was founded by Gautama Buddha, who was born about the year 560 B.C. in the Lumbini grove near the ancient town of Kapilāvastu in the present dense Terai region of Nepal. Brought up in the greatest possible luxury, married early and the father of a son, in his twentyninth year, he made his 'Great renunciation' and at the age of over eighty years he realised that his time was drawing near and thereupon he entered into dhyāna and passing through its successive stages, attained Nirvāṇa.[1]

The age in which this religious preacher was born, was one of spiritual restlessness and society was moving fast away from its ancient religious views. The same tendency could be noticed also in Greece, Persia and China, where great changes in religious thought were experienced—through the advent of Socrates with his scholarly and distinguished pupils as well as other contemporary thinkers of Greece, of Zoroaster in Persia and of

1 Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta. Dīgha Nikāya XVI. 6.8.9.

Lao-tse and Confucius in China. In India Vedic sacrifices demanded strict conformity to each letter of law more than the observance of the spirit of worship. Devotion to the God was replaced by the strict obedience to the scriptures. 'The whole sacrificial cult became complicated, costly and uncertain of results owing to the possibility of formal lapses during the performance of a rite and naturally became the monopoly of those who could remember the minutiae of each type of sacrifice and recite the mantras faultlessly. Sacrificial cruelty continued unabated and the rise of princely patrons possibly favoured the development of the priestly greed to some extent. Owing to gradual growth of rationalism in the society, growing abhorrence to animal sacrifice in Vedic rites and increasing dissatisfaction with various outward and complex practices in ceremonials, there came into existence different schools in brahmanic class, who doubted the value and validity of the sacrifices. They considered them to be frail rafts for crossing the oceans of the world (Saṁsāra) and allegorical explanations of the sacrifices were sought to be offered. Thus cosmic significance has been attached to the Aśvamedha sacrifice in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.'

That there were many *schools of thought* prevailing in our country at a time contemporaneous with or anterior to Buddha is gatherd from Dīgha Nikāya[2] and Majjhima

2 P. 47.

Nikāya.[3] Six of those main schools of thought are mentioned. One was founded by *Purāṇa Kassapa*, mainly propagating the theory of non-action (akiriyā vāda), explained by Dr. Barua as 'Passivity of Soul'—a doctrine which teaches that soul always becomes unaffected by the result of good or evil actions.

Makkhali Gosāla argued that the suffering and happiness of a person is not conditioned. He is completely helpless and his future birth and actions are all presettled (niyata). He attains certain characteristics (Saṅgati-bhāva) in every birth. According to Dr. Barua each type of existence is eternal, there being infinite gradations of existence.[4]

Ajita Keśakamabali—He was out and out a materialistic thinker preaching the doctrine of total annihilation (ucchedavāda). He believed in no rebirth and stated that the four elements of which the body of a person is composed pass away again into the elements after death. This doctrine may be misutilised by some in support of performing improper acts for worldly pleasures, as stated in the Majjhima Nikāya.[5]

Pakuda Kaccāyana enumerated the elements as seven, stating them to be existent eternally and this has been

3 II. P. 2.

4 Vide. Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, P. 306

5 I. *P.*402

designated both as Akiriyavāda (for according to him no action bears fruit) and Sāssatavāda (for the elements remain eternally).

Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta termed often as "Ajñānavādī" may be called a sceptic for he was cunning enough not to answer any question relating to eternity.

Niganṭha Nāṭaputta upheld the doctrine of Cātuyāma Saṁvara, the four restrainments to be followed by a person as referred to in the Sāmaññaphalasutta. He laid more emphasis on the rigorous practice.[6] Buddhism had also agreement with the Niganṭhas in the sense that they also laid more stress on moral outlook and disciplinary rules.

Over and above the doctrines of the six teachers mentioned above there were other more views of a good number of religious preachers and they were mostly concerned with problems relating to soul, the world and the like. The Brahmajāla Sutta has tried to mention some of them as four kinds of Sāssatavāda, four kinds of Ekacca Sāssatavāda, four kinds of Antānantikā, four kinds of Amarā vikkhepika, two classes of Adhicca samuppannikas, sixteen kinds of Uddhamāghātanika-Saññivādins, eight kinds of Uddhamaghātanika-asaññivādins, seven kinds of Ucchedavāda and five classes of Diṭṭha-dhammanibbānavādins.

6 Majjhima, I. p. 93.—"Dukkhena kho sukhaṁ adhigantabbaṃ."

There is no doubt that a good many of others were there and all of them were trying to find out a new approach to social, religious and philosophical problems to disseminate their views far and wide by wandering from place to place and thereby to spread the contagion of doubt, disbelief and defection. Though there was a large following for the Vedic austerity and sacrifice, yet it was likely that these were being gradually out-moded as urban civilization began to spread and a new class-consciousness began to question the brahmanic monopoly in spiritual matters by challenging the system of worship in which the brahmins were indispensable.

These new wanderers belonging to all classes of society mostly lived a homeless state deviating from the traditional belief by lying in debt to the gods, the sages and the ancestors[7] and laid more stress on self-culture, under the guidance of a preceptor, who supplanted the gods practically.

In this brotherhood of monks Lord Buddha joined after great renunciation and at the first stage he trained himself up under two renowned teachers—Ālāra kālāma[8] and Uddaka Rāmaputta.[9] It is not very improper if it is believed that those two learned and venerable teachers under whom his apprentices began introduced to him all the orthodox philosophies prevalent at that time and known to them. But the deliberations could scarcely satisfy him and he himself

7 Taittiriya Saṁhitā VI. 3. 10. 5.

8 Lalitavistara pp. 238-90. 9 Ibid p 243.

turned to the ancient path of austerity to discover whether practical discipline could yield the secret of existence, where ecstasy had failed. He mastered all evil thoughts and dispositions and conquered desire (tṛṣṇā), attachment and aversion (Arati). He gained deeper and deeper insight into the mysteries of existence—first of self, then of human destiny in general and lastly of the universe as a whole. He acquired supernatural powers,[10] the knowledge of the destruction of his impurities (Āsravakṣayajñāna), of the causal chain leading to birth and misery in this world[11] and of the four Āryasatyas.[12] Through sudden flash of the light of knowledge (Ekacittakṣaṇasamāyuktayā) he realised the Bodhi. He established himself first in the Tathāgatagarbha, and opened the gates to the heaven of Nirvāṇa for the common people, who were in darkness of ignorance. After achieving his object for seven days he entered into Prītyāhāravyūha Samādhi[13] enjoying the bliss of Nirvāṇa.

The basic instruction of Buddhism may be stated that just as there are ills and their causes, so also a cure and a path thereto exist. These are called Dukkha, Samudāya, Nirodha and Magga. These four could be expressed in ways more than one such as 'pavatti' (origin), 'nivatti' (cessation) and 'tadubhaya hetu (cause of the above-mentioned two). Other methods of expression have been mentioned in the

10 Ibid. pp. 344-5
11 pp. 346-50.
12 348-49.
13 Ibid. p 370.

Majjhima Nikāya[14] and we may guess then that these four were not only the terms used to mean the four truths.

Of these Dukkha consists in the congregation of five 'khandhas' causing birth, old age, death, grief, pain etc. Viśuddhimagga[15] has enumerated seven of its varieties.

Samudāya (origin) of all ills are caused by desires (Taṇhā) of various kinds such as kāma Taṇhā, bhava Taṇhā, vibhava Taṇhā.[16]

Next comes Nirodha which is nothing but the extinction of worldly objects and desires.

This cessation of desires can be attained through the eight-fold paths as:

Sammā vācā—desisting from indulging in falsehood, harsh and other sorts of malicious talks.

Sammā-kammanta—To be aloof from stealing, killing and misbehaviours.

Sammā-ājīva—Desisting from earning livelihood by foul means.

Sammā-vāyāma—Endeavour to do away with *evil* thoughts.

Sammā-Sati—Introspection to things that happen within mind by leaving aside covetousness (abhijjhā) and avoiding depression (domanassa).

Sammā-samādhi—Meditation of various kinds.

14 p. 38 15 p. 499.
16 Dīgha Nikāya p. 305

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Sammā-samādhi—Meditation of various kinds.

14 p. 38 15 p. 499.
16 Dīgha Nikāya p, 305

Sammā-saṅkappa—The determination to leave the world.

Sammā diṭṭhi—The view propounded by Buddha about the nature of the world and the ultimate.

All these eight disciplinary methods can be classified under three heads—Physical (first three)-Śīla; mental (fourth to sixth)—Citta; and intellectual (seventh and eighth) *Paññā.*

There is a note of pessimism in Buddhist thought but it may be said that this pessimism is tempered with optimism that the ills of life are escapable, unless of course we choose not to seek the way to escape and follow the blind alley of ancestral practice or wrong contemporary teaching. The suffering consists not in the felt inconveniences of life but in life itself—old age, disease, decay and other unpleasant experiences and death are only incidental to the fact of birth in different forms of existence in the three realms of desire (kāma) form (rūpa) and formlessness (Arūpa)-hellish, animal, ghostly, demonical, human and divine, none of which is free from suffering though there is a fond popular belief that gods are eternal and ever happy, which is wrong in view of the fact that they too decay and are reborn on earth, where alone man is the only creature that can attain nirvāṇa through spiritual insight and put an end to all ills.

The Pāli canons declare the existence to be impermanent (anicca), devoid of substance (anatta) and pain (dukkha). 'The characteristic nairātmya standpoint of all Buddhism can be presented as a polemic against substance, the permanent'

and the universal taken as real in the systems of the ātma-traditions; it maintains the three connected thesis —momentariness (kṣaṇikatā,) substancelessness (anātmatva) and uniqueness (Svalakṣaṇa).

To take up an example—seed is generally called the cause of the sprout but this requires some other conditions to grow into a tree. A tree may be arising out of a seed but it will be wrong to say that the big tree with its long branches on all sides remained in the seed in that form i.e. to say, that under no circumstances the two—the seed and the tree can be designated as one. Things are different in each moment and at no two moments is a thing identical. Things change every moment, uniformly, unperceivedly and relentlessly. Permanence of a thing is an illusion, like oneness of the flame or of the stream[17]. Existence is a flux. A thing is a point-instant, having neither a 'before' nor an 'after', it has no span, temporarily there is no duration. Cessation is inherent to things and is entire (a-hetuko niranvayo vināśaḥ). An entity has no extensity or comflexity of content. The oneness of many things is illusory as the oneness of a heap of corn. So a thing is not only an instant (kṣaṇika) lacking duration, but also a spatial point lacking all magnitude and diversity as well. This logic leads us

17 arciṣaṁ santāne pradipa iti upacaryate, eka iveti kṛtvā ; rāśivad dhārāvaditi. (Abhidharmakośa-vyākya of Yaśomitra pp. 705 and 713.

again to the denial of the universal (Sāmānya). The existence of a thing or its destruction are mere modes of expression, like the body of a statue or the head of a 'Rāhu.' Existence and destruction are not attributes or accretions of a thing itself. "Change on the Buddhist conception, is replacement of one entity by another, it is a series of entities emerging and perishing in entirety, one entity does not become another. Movement is not the passage of an entity from one point to another, it is the emergence at appropriate intervals, of a series of entities like the individual pictures of a movie show.[18] There is neither flow nor movement in each entity nor in the series, it is the spectator who projects that into the several static entities."

Dissentment in the Saṅgha

As is quite normal, even during the life-time of Buddha, he had to face the existence of dissentment from some of his followers. The story of Kosambī when Buddha had to intervene almost unsucessfully in the quarrel between two teachers—one a 'Dhammadhara' another a 'Vinayadhara teacher' may help us to substantiate the point. It will be further strengthened by the story of Buddha's difference of opinion with Devadatta in matter of strict discipline of the members of the Saṅgha. That Buddha was apprehending some form of dissention in the Saṅgha, which was growing

18 Na gatir nāśāt saṁskṛtaṁ kṣaṇikaṁ yataḥ.' A.K. IV, 2.

in size day after day, is clear from the stress which he laid on the importance of concord in the Saṅgha (Samaggā parisā). He further said in course of one of his discourses that Saṅgha would be strengthened in case all his disciples seek shelter in religious function without quarrel. The example of such dissentment can also be noticed in the proceedings of the first council, when Gavampati was not ready to accept in *toto* the decision of the council and as far as the informations of Cullavagga[19] permit us to know, it is clear that Purāṇa also did not regard the proceedings as the words of the teacher.

Whatever may be the cause of all these dissentments, there is no denying the fact that these forces helped to a certain extent the establishment of seventeen heretical sects within two hundred years after the Nirvāṇa of Buddha. In course of time, some of these sects disappeared while new ones grew up with the result that at the time of Kaniṣka about 78 A.D. the Buddhists had already been divided into 18 sects[20] grouped into four classes as follows:

I. Ārya Sarvāstivāda
   (a) Mūla Sarvāstivāda
   (b) Kāśyapīya
   (c) Mahīśāsaka

19 XI. I. II.

20 Vide Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta vol I. part III. p. 18.

(d) Dharma Guptīya
(e) Bahu Śrutīya
(f) Tāmra Śātīya
(g) Vibhajyavādin

II. Ārya Śammitīya
(h) Kurukullaka
(i) Āvantika
(k) Vātsīputriya

These ten schools belong to the Vaibhāṣika school of Philosophy.

III. Ārya Mahā Sāṁghika
(l) Pūrva-Salia
(m) Apara-Śalia
(n) Haimavata
(o) Lokottaravādin
(p) Prajñaptivādin

IV. Ārya Sthavira
(q) Mahāvihāra
(r) Jetavaniya
(s) Abhayagirivāsin

The eight schools, other than those mentioned above belonged to the Sautrāntika school of Philosophy. Early Buddist historians like Vasumitra, Vinītadeva and Bhavya speak of eighteen different schools, all rightly claiming to embody the true teaching of the Master. There is discrepancy with regard to the individual names and the classi-

fication. Reference may also be made to Vasumitra's Nikāyālambana Śāstra, translated into English by Masuda (Asia Major vol. II, 1925). The Kathā-Vatthu, its commetary and the Dīpa-Vaṁśa (pp. 37-38) give the Pāli or southern version. Of these 18 sects, four schools Sthaviravāda, Sarvāsti-vāda, Mahā Saṁghika and Sammitīya are prominent, others being offshots of those.

Śthavīra-vāda was prominent at first but it declined in importance gradually disappearing almost completely from India. It is now existing in Ceylon, Burma and Siam.

Sarvāstivāda was the most influential school and had its ramifications all over the country, including Kāśmīra and Gāndhāra.

Original works on the Sāmmitiya school are lost. Universally condemned by other schools as heretical, they held tenaciously to the doctrine of individual (pudgalaātman), a quasi-permanent entity, neither completely identical with nor different from the mental states.

The Mahā Saṅghikas may be described as the precursors of the Mahāyāna religion and philosophy. The Dīpavaṁśa[21] records that the Mahāsaṁghikas introduced ten new Vinayic rules and tried to propound new doctrines. That they had a canon of their own is referred to in the inscription of Amarāvatī and Nāgārjuna Koṇḍa. They claimed Mahā-

21 Chapter IV.

Kāśyapa as their founder and the language of their Piṭaka was Prākṛt.

Buddha and Bodhisattva to them have been deified and everything of a Buddha was imagined as superhuman.[22] Buddhas are described as existing in all corners of the world (Sabbādisā Buddhā tiṭṭhanti). About Arhats it is stated by one section that they may fall from the position of Arhathood.

The Sarvāstivāda doctrine was developed out of the doctrines of the Mahiṁ Śāsakas. The second council paved the wav for two schools. Yaśa at that council had supporters from two centres—Kauśāmbī and, Avantī; and other from Mathurā. The monks from Mathurā became forerunners of Sarvāstivāda school. According to Tibetan traditions, the school adopted Sanskrit as the medium and had their canon of own.

They believe that the five dharmas exist even in the subtlest form for all time—past, present and future. Though things arising out of dharmas can be destroyed, that does not mean that the dharmas will also be so. The five dharmas are not the five Khandhas. They are (a) mind (citta), (b) states of mind (caitasika) (c) matter (rūpa) (d) states, not mental (visaṃprayakta saṃskāra) (e) unconstituted (asaṃskṛtas). According to them an Arhat though he may have

22 Samyak Sāmbuddhānāṁ samudāgamaḥ so pi lokottaraḥ Mahāvastu I. p. 159.

'*atīta rāga*' past attachment, should in no way be regarded as 'with attachment'—'*Sarāgo*'. Buddha here has been regarded as a human being but with divine powers.

Theravāda or Sthaviravāda had its alternative name as Vibhajyavāda. The Kathāvatthu uses another name as Śakavāda. The foundation of the school has been ascribed to Mahākaccāyana-a native of Ujjeni. The Tibetan tradition states that the school of Theravāda had its Piṭaka in Paiśācī dialect.

According to this doctrine common and ordinary persons (puthujjana) cannot be in a position to wipe away from mind 'rāga' and 'dosā.' Arhats being perfect can never fall form that stage as they attain the knowledge that they are free from all troubles (Kṣayajñāna). They are classified into two groups as Svadharma Kuśala and Paradharmakuśala. All Arhats attain Nirvāṇa. The existence of 'pudgala' is denied. The Bodhisattvas have been described as average beings,. and subject to Kleśas. About Buddhas it is said that they possess Rūpakāya and are subject to all the physical frailties of human beings. The distinction is that Bodhi makes him a Buddha. They are above maitrī and karuṇā though they show them to other beings. All the practices and fruits after Śrota-ā pattiphala are supramundane (*lokottara*) and not worldly (*laukika*)

The origin of the school of the Sammitiyas has been ascribed to Mahākaccāyama of Avaṇtī. The principal doctrine of the school is the recognition of a pudgala besides

the elements, but neither identical with nor different from the Skandhas. Dharmas cannot transmigrate from one world to another apart from the pudgala. These can be said to transmigrate along with the pudgala.

The philosophical views of the eighteen schools referred to in the above list became gradually formulated into two schools—*Vaibhāṣika* and *Sautrāntika*. The Mahāyānā sect of the Buddhists founded by Kaniṣka established two other schools of philosophy—the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika.

Vaibhāṣika School: —Vaibhāṣika was a later appellation of the philosophy of the Sarvastivāda sect, who admitted the reality of the world internal and external. They stated that our cognition and corresponding external object are both real. Fundamental philosophical work of this sect is Kātyāyanīputra's Abhidharmajñānaprasthāna śāstra composed probably 300 years after the Nirvāṇa of Buddha. The next work of the sect is Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-Śāstra or simply Vibhāṣā (composed) at the council of Kaniska about 78 AD. It was from this Vibhāṣā that the name Vaibhāṣika was derived. Vibhāṣā is a commentary and the philosophy has been so called because it was based on the commentaries rather than on the original texts of the teachings of Buddha.

Among the Vaibhāṣikas themselves there are different views in certain points. Those of Kāshmira were known as Kashmirian Vaibhāṣika, those of western country (Gāndhāra)

were called pāścātya Vaibhāṣikas, also referred to as Aparāntakas, Bahirdeśakas Gāndhārācāryas. They affirm the existence of past, present and future. As regards the apparent anomaly as to how in view of non-existence of all objects, an object can exist at that point of time, Dharmatrātā replies that any kind of change in fact is a change of modes and not in substance. The substance gold undergoes several changes through which it comes to be called neclace, ear-ring etc. but there is no change in gold itself. Ghoṣaka argues that when an object is said to be past, it is not entirely deprived of the character of future and the present. Basumitra holds that the changes undergone by the things are in their aspects of positions, states (avasthā). He says that a thing is spoken of variously according to the varying aspects and these variations relate to the aspect and not to the substance, as the substance remains the same in all three points of time. Lord said that the changes are due to the change in relativity (anyathānyathiha). A woman is called mother and same is called daughter.

Vaibhāṣikas are realistic, and for the world order they accept the atomic theory refuted by the Jogacāras and the Mādhyamikas.

Sautrāntika :—In the Abhidharma Koṣavyākhyā, Yaśomitra has stated that those who hold the Sūtras as their authority and not the Śāstras, are Sautrāntikas. They do not admit the authority of the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins, for according to them those Abhidharmas are far from the

sayings of the Buddha. The word sūtrānta means that which is definitely ascertained in the sūtras—'original texts'. The text on which this philosophy is based belonged to the sect of Ārya sthaviras, who held the first council in 490 B.C. and possibly also the sect of the Mahāsaṁghikas who were the first dissenters in 390 B.c. The philosophical principles of this school are said to have been formulated in Kashmira during the reign of Kaniska about 78 A.D. by a sage named Dharmottara. According to Hwen Thsang however it was founded by the renowned teacher Kumāralabdha.

Like the Vaibhāṣikas the Sautrāntikas are also realists; the difference between them being that while the Vaibhāṣikas hold that that the external world is perceived, the Sautrāntikas affirm that it is known by inference.

Two schools are ascribed to the Sautrāntikas—Sautrāntika and Dārṣṭāntikaṣ.

They have cut down the inflated lists of dharmas drawn by the Vaibhāṣikas. In the final analysis a list of 43 elements under five heads was drawn up. This comprises (a) Matter (rūpa), (b) Feeling (vedanā), (c) Signs, sense-organs (saṁjñā), (d) Consciousness (vijñāna) and (e) Forces (Saṁskāras). *The real contribution of the Sautrāntika to the development of Indian thought is the discovery of the subjective—the transcendental—function of the mind in constructing the empirical world.*

Yogācāra—This school was founded by Maitreyanātha by A. D. 270-350. He is represented by his illustrious

disciple Asaṅga and his more renowned brother Vasumitra. The word Yogācāra is compounded of 'Yoga' meaning meditation and 'ācāra' meaning practice. It was so called because it emphasised the practice of meditation as the means of attaining bhūmis or the seventeen stages of Buddhistic perfection. This school is generally known in China, Tibbet and Nepal as Yogācaryā. Yogācārins maintain that the external objects are unreal but the reality of our cognition can not be denied. The chief dogma established in it is 'ālaya-vijñāna,' the basis of conscious states, which is the same as our 'ego' or soul. Vijñāna is the soul reality, the object in its form as substance, (chair, table etc.) and modes or attributes is a false superimposition (upacāra) in the states of consciousness which alone are real. The states or strata of vijñāna are three—ālayavijñāna, manovijñāna and pravṛttivijñāna. Of these the ālaya is the repository, the carrier of all Vāsanās, the potential state of things. The other vijñānas are connected with it as its consequences. The other two strata not only draw upon the ālaya, but also replenish it. Ālaya is compared to a mighty stream. The ālaya is coterminous with phenomenal existence [Evamālayavijñāne sati saṁsārapravṛttiḥ nivṛttiśca] [*P.*38 Triṁśika]. Ālaya is definitely taken as ceasing even in the Arhat stage, a stage corresponding to Jīvan-mukti [Tasyavyāvṛttirarhatve]. The state of pure consciousness is not mind, not apprehension ; but transcendental consciousness (lokottaram jñānam). It is the un-

defiled essence (dhātu), unthinkable, benign, eternal, blessed —the four Dharmakāya of the Lord Buddha.

Mādhyamika

As we have already seen, the Sautrāntika epistomology is based on the recognition of two classes of objects—thing in itself and its conceptual representation in thought. It asserts that we are in direct contact with the real in perception and the subjective factor is mistaken for the objective, the thing-in-itself. This has led to important development in two directions—to the Mādhyamika absolutism and the idealism of the Yogācāra. Mādhyamikas assert that Sautrāntikas hastily erect a speculative system by accepting the reality of momentary entities on which thought-forms are imposed. The real cannot be conceived either as momentary or permanent, particular or universal. Both are vikalpa—conceptual construction. To apprehend the real as it is, these dṛṣṭis have to be negated. This is the Mādhyamika dialectic.

The founder of Mādhyamika school of philosophy, was Nāgārjuna who lived about the first century A. D. and wrote the Mūlamadhyamakārikā. Next the charge of piloting the doctrine of Śūnya fill on his disciple Āryadeva, who is traditionally known as the foster-son of a king of Siṁhala. He also occupied the covetable position of Nāgārjuna as the spiritual head of Mādhyamika school. Of various works by Āryadeva only Catuḥśataka is available.

It is written in Sanskrit. He is stated to have lived in Nālandā for pretty long days and died by 2nd century A. D. at Kāñcī. Mātṛcetā, who for his versatile genius and art of refuting others, way rightly called as Durdharṣakāla was a good scholar both in Hinayāna and Mahāyāna. Of his works only two Varṇārha-Varṇastotra in 400 verses and Śatapañcā Śatkanāmastotra in 150 verses are available and are equally appreciated by the Hinayānists and the Mahāyānists. In the list of abbotship of Nālandā after Āryadeva, we get the names of Rāhulabhadra, disciple of Aryadeva ; Rāhulamitra, disciple of Rāhulabhadra ; Nāgamitra disciple of Rāhulamitra ; Saṅgharakṣita disciple of Rāhulamitra, who according to Tārānātha lived about the beginning of 5th century A. D. In the same century we get Kumārajīva, translator of Sanskrit texts into Chinese and a strong follower of Mādhyamika school. Saṁgharakṣita had two scholar disciples in Buddhapālita, who wrote a commentary on Mūlamadhyamaka Śūtra and adopted Prāsaṅgika method for establishing Śūnyatā ; and in Bhāvaviveka, who following Svātantrika (direct) method established Śūnyatā in his text Prajñāpradīpa commendary in Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. His other independent work is Mādhyamika-hṛdaya, with his own commentary designated as 'Tarkajāla'.

The greatest exponent of Mādhyamika philosophy was Candrakīrti, who following Prāsaṅgika method of Buddhapālita in his commentary on the Mūlamadhyamaka, explained

in most clear and comprehensive way Nāgārjuna's doctrine of Śūnyatā. He also became an abbot of Nālandā and wrote various commentaries and a treatise in verse called Samantabhadra. Śāntideva, a disciple of Jayadeva, was the most famous writer on Mādhyamika system after Candrakīrti. His works are Śikṣāsamuccaya, Bodhicaryāvatāra and Sūtrasamuccaya.

After Śāntideva, Sarvajñamitra, became one of the principal teachers of Nālandā. His work Sragdharāstava is preserved in original Sanskrit.*

The school derives its name from Madhyama, the middle and is called so because it avoids two extremes—reality as well as unreality of the world, choosing only a middle path inculcating that the world has only a conditional existence. [Ato bhāvābhāvāntadvayarahitatvāt sarvasvabhāvānutpattilakṣaṇā śūnyatā madhyamā pratipat madhyamo mārga ityucyate]. In the Mahāvagga (Vinaya) (1-6-17) we get a particular idea about middlepath by rejecting the two extreme views of excessive worldly enjoyments and too much self-mortifications. Buddha in Sanskrit is often termed as 'Advayavādin'—one who asserts 'not-two'. Here two denotes two *'antas'*—existent and non-existent, eternal and non-eternal. Nāgārjuna in his Madhyamaka kārikā (V. 8) says: "Those ignorant people who see

* Details of these are available in Dr. Nālinākṣa Dutt's article on Buddhism in Chap. XVIII of *Classical Age*.

existence and nonexistence, do not see the cessation of the visible which is blissful." And he further adds that this middle of the two extremes cannot be illustrated and is baseless, appearanceless, markless and without any denomination. Thus clearly stated nothing is existent nor is anything non-existent, nothing comes into being nor does anything disappear, nothing is eternal nor has anything an end; nothing is identical nor differentiated, nothing moves hither, nor moves anything thither. Though generally two points are considered—one positive and another negative, yet sometimes they come under four points—'*Catuskoṭi*'. The position of the Mādhyamikas becomes more clear when the theory of Dependent origination (pratītya samutpāda) comes in view. Each object has its Svabhāva 'innate state' or nature, as we may state that heat is the svabhāva of fire. This svabhāva is that nature of man which is not fictitious (a-kṛtrima) and is not dependent on other for existence, and which does not come into being afterwards having not been before. This svabhāva is dharmatā—the state of being 'naiḥsvabhāvya.' It is tathatā—(suchness) a state not liable to change (avikṛta) the state of remaining always (sadaivasthāyitā). "Accordingly we cannot say that heat is the Svabhāva of fire. But as the non-origination of fire is independent of others and not fictitious, it is to be regarded as its svabhāva." (*M. vr. pp. 264-5.*)

Like fire, anything is devoid of its svabhāva as it itself has no existence. This state of being devoid of 'svabhāva'

is in fact meant by the word Śūnyatā' in this system in such cases in the sacred texts as 'Sarvadharmāḥ Śūnyāḥ'— all elements of existence are void.

Mādhyamikasūtra of Nāgārjuna is the main text of Mādhyamika Philosophy. The Mādhyamika Philosophy tries to adopt the means between extreme affirmation and extreme negation. 'Nāgārjuna's philosophy is nearer now to scepticism now to mysticism. His scepticism is due to his realising the essential relativity of thought. Yet he has faith in an absolute standard of reality. His scepticism is Buddhistic while his absolutism derives from the Upaniṣad. In the true philosophical spirit Nāgārjuna records the paradoxes which our everyday consciousness veils by means of a more or less thoughtless phraseology and indifference to reflection. The Yogācāra suggests the relational view of reality from which Nāgārjuna develops his scepticism. But the positive part of his philosophy is not different from the Advaitic interpretation of the Upaniṣadic view. It is a serious mistake to suppose that we have in Nāgārjuna only a revival of the Upaniṣadic doctrine. He seems to draw his inspiration from the Upaniṣads, though his philosophy is developed within the shadow of and with special reference to the Buddhistic views. The result is a type of thought which had never existed before, though it is supposed to be derived from the Prajñāpāramitā.'[23]

The Mādhyamika theory of phenomenal nature of the world follows from the doctrine of Pratītya samutpāda i.e.

23 *Indian Philosophy—Radhakrishnan vol. I. p.* 645.

dependent origination. A thing, properly looked at, will appear as a mass of dharmas following one another in unbroken succession. Nothing exists by itself. Everything is dependent on another thing. The Mādhyamikas do not dismiss all dharmas as well as their collections as unreal, though they look upon them as phenomenal and momentary.[24] When we come rationally to examine things, we cannot ascertain the nature of anything, hence all things must be declared to be inexplicable and devoid of any assignable nature or character. Nāgārjuna admits that relations constitute the world, which is a mere complex of these relations. All things of the world have no substantial existence. They are hypostatised relations. Nāgārjuna shows that the whole world of experience is an appearance, a mere net work of unintelligible relations.

A daring logician as he was, Nāgārjuna in course of his arguments proves that the world, having birth, life and death is unreal (chap. XI). So also are suffering (chap XII), Saṁskāras (chap XIII), bondage, liberation (chap XVI), and actions (chap XVIII). And the reason is the relation, whose nature is incomprehensible. He had the courage to state that in reality there is no Buddha or Tathāgata. In the absence of anything as real, no possibility of misunderstanding arrives (chap XXIII). Thus has been proved even the unreality of four noble truths (XXIV) and conceptions of

24 Laṅkāvatāra sūtra (ii—173)

Nirvāṇa (chap XXV). In short "there is nothing real. The world has only phenomenal existence and things are neither transient nor eternal, neither produced nor destroyed, neither the same nor different, neither coming forth nor passing away except in appearance. The world is nothing more than an ideal system of qualities and relations. We believe in relations which cannot be intelligibly explained. It is the higher superestition of science, that the categories useful in the world of experience are ultimately real, that Nāgārjuna explodes." [Indian phi. vol. I. p. 655.] The world that is experienced by us is an illusion bred by relations. The world is made up of mutually dependent objects and they give us provisional seeming reality—the object of conventional knowledge (Saṁvṛti). His positson is like that of Green who says that 'the reality of experience is a relational one except for the absolute, which stands behind.' In may be said of Nāgārjuna that "he was not a mere destructive sceptic, but a constructive thinker. He pulls to pieces all experiences, so that he may reveal the absolute behind it."

Śūnyatā, the principal doctrine of the Mādhyamika school,

Śūnyatā is the principal doctrine, which has been attempted to be proved in the Mādhyamika Vṛtti of Nāgārjuna. In is often erroneously thought that Nāgārjuna was the founder of the doctrine of Śūnyatā but in this connection it must be noted that the doctrine was existent before Nāgārjuna, in the Mahāyāna sūtras. Nāgārjuna only worked

on the threads already available in the Mahāyāna Sūtra works and developed a perfect form of philosophy out of them.

The word Śūnya is scarcely interpreted in the proper sense. The misunderstanding arises out of the literal meaning of the word. To the Mādhyamikas it means neither 'nothing', nor 'an empty void' nor a 'negative abyss', but it is characterised by them as indescribable (avācya.), it being beyond the four categories of intellect. (catuskoti-vinirmukta). Śūnyatā is a doctrine which cannot be imparted to one by another (aparapratyaya), which does not admit of different meanings (anānārtha), which is not fit to be expressed (prapañcairaprapañcitam) which cannot be realised in concepts (nirvikalpa) and lastly which is characterised by the nature of cessation (Śāntam). It is, in short the reality, transcending ultimately existence and non-existence or both and neither. About the ultimate reality nothing can be predicted, for it is Pure Reason, and no category of intellect can adequately describe it. Śūnyatā must be understood in the sense of 'devoid of ultimate reality' (Svabhāva śūnya), while Reality is devoid of Plurality (Prapañca śūnya). Hence it has got double meaning of Relativity and Reality. Objects which are dependent on others for existence, being relative (Pratītya-samutpanna) are practically non-originating (paramārthato notpannaḥ). As the real always appears, those relative objects have also got some kind of reality. Reality is one in which all pluralities merge (Advaya). Thus Śūnya in the present context

does not mean nihilism (nāstitva) or void, it means on the other hand, to be devoid of ultimate reality and plurality.

All negations depend on a hidden affirmation in as much as absolute negation is an impossibility. Total scepticism is a figment, since such scepticism implies the validity of the sceptic's judgment. The purpose behind this so called destructive philosophy of the Śūnyavāda is to prove the ultimate unreality of all phenomena. Absolute negation necessarily presupposes affirmation. Śūnyavādins deny the ultimate reality of both affirmation and negation. The Saddharma Puṇḍarīka states in clear terms that a person entangled in the categories of intellect is a blind born man. The positive aspect of this philosophy asks men to rise above the categories and contradictions of intellect and embrace Reality. It is stated that the Real itself only appears. Reality is immanent in appearances, yet it transcends them all—it is Absolute, Blissful and beyond the range of intellect, where all pluralities are merged. This shows the constructive side of Śūnyavāda. The suchness (tathatā) of all dharmas is the suchness of Reality. The phenomenal is the noumenal and the noumenal is the phenomenal. Appearances are Reality or the Brahman which at once transcends the duality of the relative and the absolute. They are not diverse, they do not form a duality.*

* Sarvadharmā nāgacchanti na gacchanti na rajyante na virajyante asaktāḥ saṅgāsaṅga brahmabhutāḥ.—Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā. pp. 476-477.

These teachers of Śūnyatā Philosophy did not at all leave the question of phenomenal, as by stepping on it one can proceed to the noumenal.

[Vyavahāramanāśritya paramārtho na diśyate
paramārthamanāgamya nirvāṇaṁ nādhigamyate.]

Practically speaking Śūnya has a meaning of affirmation, as big in magnitude as the Sumeru mountain. Persons propagating Śūnyatā as mere nothing fails to understand the true significance of it.

[Baraṁ khalu Sumerumātrā pudgaladṛṣtirnatveva
nāstyastitvābhimānikasya śūnyatādṛṣṭiḥ]

(Laṅkāvatāra. *P. 146*).

Nāgārjuna in clear terms has stated that in the phenomenal world Relativity is the guiding factor and one realising it can gain true significance of Noble truths and Pratītya-samutpāda. (Mādh. Vr. XXIV/40).

[Yaḥ pratītya samutpādaṁ paśyatīdaṁ sa paśyati
Duḥkhaṁ samudayaṁ caiva nitrodhaṁ mārgamevaca.]

Thus both in Mādhyamikavṛtti and Vigraha-vyāvartinī Kārikā (22. 67) Nāgārjuna stated that by Sūnyatā he did not mean mere negation, but he meant dependent origination or relativity.

The idea of absolute cannot be attained in the absence of the knowledge of phenomenal. One who has realised the significance of Śūnyatā is in a position to understand the implication of everything. Similarly one who has not realised the truth of the doctrine of Śūnyatā will

to realise the meaning and significance of surely fail everything.

Sārvañca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate
Sarvaṁ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṁ yasya na yujyate.

Āryadeva says that the doctrine of Mādhyamikas is not nihilism. Nihilism, he says, trembles with fear even at the very name of the doctrine.

A fine illustration has been set here to explain the acceptance of phenomenality. One cannot talk with a Mleccha when one is not in a position to speak his language. Similarly one can explain reality, to common man, when one comes down to common level.

Nānyayā bhāṣayā mlecchaḥ śakyo grāhayituṁ yathā
Na laukikamṛte lokoḥ śakyo grāhayituṁ tathā
(Catuḥśataka—p. 194)

Inspite of the fact that phenomenal has been described as appearance merely, the Mādhyamikas never try to undermine its empirical reality. Even Lord Buddha preached his doctrine from phenomenal point of view. Ultimately speaking there is neither Saṁsāra nor Nirvāṇa. If there is Saṁsāra the question of destruction does not arise at all. The non-existent snake wrongly superimposed on a rope in darkness is not destroyed when in light we recognise the thing to be only a rope.

[Bastukocintāyāntu Śaṁsara eva nāsti
Tat kutosya parikṣayaḥ pradīpāvasthāyāṁ ?]
(Candrakīrti—p. 220)

Candrakīrti boldly announces that they are not nihilists in the proper sense of the term. The reason shown by him is this that their doctrine transcends both affirmation and negation. The non-dual path shown by them leads to the blissful gateway to Nirvāṇa. The empirical reality of the phenomena is not denied but their ultimate unreality is established:

[Na vayaṁ nāstikāḥ. Astitvanāstitvadvayavādanirāsena tu vayaṁ nirvāṇapuragāminamadvayaṁ vidyotayāmaḥ. Na ca karmakartṛphalādikaṁ nāstīti brūmaḥ, kim tarhi niḥsvabhāvametaditi vyavasthāpayāmaḥ.

(Candrakīrti—p. 329)]

The Śūnyavādins do not stop at the denial of relative existence, they prove further to transcend relativity itself and by transcending relativity, intellect itself becomes transcended and in the absence of affirmation and negation; intellect finding no categories for its support merges in the Absolute.

Summary of the Chapters

CHAPTER I

The book opens with a bold proclamation of the doctrine of No-origination. Nothing can be produced, for a thing can originate neither out of itself, nor out of non-self, nor out of both nor out of neither. Then the four

conditions (pratyayas) of the Hinayāna have been examined. They are Hetu (producing cause), Ālambana (supporting cause), Samanantara (proximate cause) and Ādhipateya (predominating cause). It has been shown that in none of these four Pratyayas, neither singly, nor jointly can we find the so-called 'effect'. Then the effect has been examined to show that if effect does not exist in the causes how can it be produced out of them ? The question of pre-existence of effect in cause and non-preexistence has been judged to show that production in all cases is an impossibility. Both cause and effect are relative and therefore causality is only an appearance, not reality.

CHAPTER II

In the second chapter Nāgārjuna establishes that motion is an impossibility. Proceeding on the argument that one cannot travel a path, which has already been travelled (gataṁ na gamyate) nor can one travel a path which is not yet travelled (Agataṁ na gamyate), it is not also possible to travel a path which has neither been travelled nor yet to be travelled ; it has been proved that a mover does not move (gantā na gacchati), again the non-mover does not move (agantā naiva gacchati) and who is the third then who is neither a mover, nor a non-mover which can move. Thus Nāgārjuna has shown that a goer, the going and the path to be travelled are all unreal.

CHAPTER III

After enumerating the six sense-organs and their actions, Nāgārjuna took up the cause of eye, beginning with the argument that the eye organ (darśana) is unable to see its own self, hence is not fit to see others. The illustration of fire which burns other objects while remaining unburnt is also rejected following the process adopted in the case of rejection of 'gata' and 'agata'. Gradually it has been shown that there is no seer (draṣṭā), the act of seeing, or the object to be seen (Draṣṭavyaṁ darśanaṁ caiva draṣtaryasati te kutaḥ). The non-existence of other sense-organs has been proved in the similar way.

CHAPTER IV

Skhandhaparīkṣā—The four elements (māhābhūtas) are the causes (Kāraṇam) of rūpa. Now Rūpa, Śavda, Gandha, Rasa and Sparśa outside the four elements and separated from those are not seen. The cause of rūpa (form) again cannot be imagined without rūpa. Nāgārjuna argues that even if there is rūpa its cause cannot be established (Rūpe satyeva rūpasya kāraṇaṁ nopapadyate) and the argument is equally applicable in case of non-existence of rūpa (Rūpesatyeva rūpasya kāraṇaṁ nopapadyate). And a causeless (niṣkāraṅam) form (rūpa) cannot be established. This cause of form (rūpakāraṅam) even if proved, is not in a position to produce identical or non-identical effects. Thus Rūpa cannot be proved to exist. By the application of same

argument it has been shown that other feelings like vedanā etc. may be examined in the same way.

CHAPTER V.

The Dhātus, Skandhas and Āyatanas have been examined by Nāgārjuna in this chapter. The six elements are earth, water, fire, air, sky and vijñāna. He has first examined the characteristics of sky, which is something uncoverable (anāvaraṇam). Nāgarjuna has proceeded with the argument that before the characteristics of sky are found out, there cannot be anything as sky [nākāśaṁ vidyate kiñcit pūrvamākāśalakṣaṇāt]. If it exists then at the time of existence, it is bound to be devoid of characteristics. An existent object without characteristic fectures is like a flower in the sky. Again it is argued that characteristics cannot be applied to an object with or without characteristics (nālakṣaṇe lakṣaṇasya pravṛttirna salakṣaṇe). He has then proved that neither lakṣya nor 'lakṣaṇam' can exist and in their absence, 'bhāva' (existent object) cannot exist. Thus proving the non-existence of '*bhāva*' and thereby of sky, the non-existence of other elements has been proved (ākāśasamā dhātavaḥ pañca ye pare).

मूलमध्यमककारिका



❀प्रत्ययपरीक्षा नाम प्रथमप्रकरणम्

अनिरोधमनुत्पादमनुच्छेदमशाश्वतम्
अनेकार्थमनानार्थमनागममनिर्गमम्।
यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं प्रपञ्चोपशमम् शिवम्
देशयामास सम्बुद्धस्तं वन्दे वदतांवरम्॥

इदानीमनिरोधादिविशिष्टप्रतीत्यसमुत्पादप्रतिपादयिषया उत्पादप्रतिषेधेन निरोधादिप्रतिषेधे सौकर्यं मन्यमान आचार्यः प्रथममेवोत्पादप्रतिषेधमारभते। उत्पादः परैः परिकल्प्यमानः सर्वथा नोपपद्यते इति निश्चित्य आह—

*न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्यहेतुतः।
उत्पन्ना जातु विद्यन्ते भावाः क्वचन केचन॥१॥

Beng. Trans. কোন বস্তু (ভাব) কোথাও স্বয়ং বা অন্যের সাহায্যে বা স্বকীয় ও পরকীয় উভয়ের যোগে অথবা কারণাভাব হইতে কখন উৎপন্ন হয় না।

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* हेतुः प्रत्ययो निदानं कारणं निमित्तम् लिङ्गमुपनिषदिति पर्यायाः
कोशस्थान—२, का—४९, स्फुटार्था।

Eng. Trans. An entity cannot originate (be produced) either out of itself (independently) or through the assistance of others or through the cooperation of self and other object or through absence of cause.

Extracts from Candrakīrti—অতিপ্রসঙ্গদোষান্নহি স্বাত্মনো বিদ্যমানানাং পদার্থানাং পুনরুৎপাদে প্রয়োজনমস্তি। পরতোপি নোপপদ্যন্তে ভাবাঃ, পরাভাবাদেব। আচার্যবুদ্ধপালিতমতে ন পরত উৎপদ্যন্তে ভাবাঃ, সর্বতঃ সর্বসম্ভবপ্রসঙ্গাৎ। দ্বাভ্যামপি নোপজায়ন্তে ভাবা উভয়পক্ষাভিহিতদোষপ্রসঙ্গাৎ প্রত্যেকমুৎপাদাসামর্থ্যাচ্চ। অহেতুতোঽপি ন, হেতাবসতি কার্যঞ্চ কারণঞ্চ ন বিদ্যতে ইতি বক্ষ্যমাণদোষপ্রসঙ্গাৎ।

* Compare Gauḍapāda's kārikā II-32

ন নিরোধো ন চোৎপত্তির্ন বদ্ধো ন চ সাধকঃ।
ন মুমুক্ষু র্নবৈ মুক্ত ইত্যেষা পরমার্থতা॥

চত্বারঃ প্রত্যয়াঃ হেতুশ্চালম্বনমনন্তরম্।
তথৈবাধিপতেয়ং চ প্রত্যয়ো নাস্তি পঞ্চমঃ॥২॥

Beng. Trans. চারিটী প্রত্যয়—হেতু, আলম্বন, অনন্তর ও আধিপতেয়। ইহা ব্যতীত পঞ্চম অন্য কোন প্রত্যয় নাই।

Eng. Trans. Pratyayas (causes) are four in number, designated as Hetu (root cause), Ālambana (supporting cause) Anantara (proximate cause), and Ādhipateya (predominating cause). There is no other cause as fifth.

[নির্বর্ত্তককে হেতু বলা হয়; উৎপদ্যমান ধর্ম্ম যে আলম্বনের মাধ্যমে উৎপন্ন হয় তাহা তাহার আলম্বন প্রত্যয়; যাহার পরে যাহার

উৎপত্তি সেই পূর্ববর্তী অবস্থাকে অনন্তর প্রত্যয় বলে ; যাহা হইলে যাহা হয় তাহাই তাহার আধিপতেয় প্রত্যয়]

Extracts from Candrakīrti—योहि यस्य निर्वर्तको बीजभावेनावस्थितः स तस्य हेतुप्रत्ययः। उत्पद्यमानो धर्मो येनालम्बनेनोत्पद्यते स एव तस्यालम्बनप्रत्ययः। कारणस्यानन्तरो निरोधः कार्यस्योत्पत्तिप्रत्ययस्तथा बीजस्यानन्तरनिरोधोऽङ्कुरस्योत्पादप्रत्ययः। यस्मिन् सति यद्भवति तत्तस्याधिपतेयमिति। ये चान्ये चत्वारः प्रत्ययाः पुरोजात-पश्चाजात-सहजातादय स्ते एतेष्वेवान्तर्भूताः। ईश्वरादयस्तु प्रत्यया एव न सम्भवन्तीति। अतएवावधारयन्ति प्रत्ययो नास्ति पञ्चम इति। तस्मादेभ्यः परभूतेभ्यो भावानाम् उत्पत्तिरस्ति परत उत्पत्तिरिति।

अत्रोच्यते—नैव हि भावनां परभूतेभ्यः उत्पत्तिरिति—

ভাব পদার্থের পরভূত প্রত্যয় হইতে উৎপত্তি হইতে পারেনা, কারণ—

न हि स्वभावो भावानां प्रत्ययादिषु विद्यते।
अविद्यमाने स्वभावे परभावो न विद्यते ॥३॥

Beng. Trans. পদার্থের স্বভাব (স্বকীয়রূপ) প্রত্যয়াদির মধ্যে বর্ত্তমান নাই। স্বভাবের অবর্ত্তমানে অন্য হইতে উৎপন্ন হওয়াও সম্ভবপর নয়।

Eng. Trans. The real nature of an existing object does not lie in the causes and in the absence of that nature it is not possible for it to arise out of another thing.

Candrakīrti—यदि हि हेत्वादिषु परभूतेषु प्रत्ययेषु समस्तेषु व्यस्तेषु व्यस्तसमस्तेषु हेतुप्रत्ययसामग्र्यामन्यत्र च क्वचिद्भावानां कार्याणामुत्पादात्पूर्वं

सत्त्वं स्यात्तेभ्य उत्पादः, न चैवं यदुत्पादात् पूर्वसम्भवः स्यात्। ... ... तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् परेभ्यो भावानामुत्पत्तिरिति। ... परव्यपदेशाभावादेव न परत उत्पाद इति।

तदेवं प्रत्ययेभ्य उत्पादवादिनि प्रतिषिद्धे, क्रियात उत्पादवादी मन्यते न चक्षुरादयः प्रत्ययाः साक्षाद्विज्ञानं जनयन्ति। विज्ञानजनिक्रिया-निष्पादकत्वात्तु प्रत्यया उच्यन्ते। भावः क्रियाविज्ञानं जनयति। तस्मात् प्रत्ययवती विज्ञानजनिक्रिया विज्ञानजनिकाप्रत्यया, यथा परिक्रिया ओदनस्य। उच्यते—

क्रिया न प्रत्ययवती नाप्रत्ययवती क्रिया।
प्रत्यया नाक्रियावन्तः क्रियावन्तश्च सन्त्युत ॥४॥

Beng. Trans. क्रिया प्रत्यययुक्त नय आबार अप्रत्यय युक्तओ नय। प्रत्यय सकल क्रिया रहित नय वा क्रियायुक्त नय।

Eng. Trans. An effect is neither with cause nor with non cause, and on the other hand the causes are neither with effect nor without effect.

Candrakīrti—एवं परिक्रियादयोऽपि भावा उक्ता वेदितव्या इति नास्ति क्रियातोऽपि समुत्पत्तिर्भावानामिति भवति उत्पादाभिधानमर्थशून्यम्।

[यदि क्रिया (कार्य्य-effect) थाकित ताहा हइले चक्षुरादि प्रत्ययेर योगे कारणयुक्त (प्रत्ययवती) हइया विज्ञान उत्पादन करित। किन्तु कार्य्यइ (क्रिया) नाइ। आबार कारणशून्य कार्य्य हय ना। कार्य्यविहीन कारण थाकिते पारे ना। अथच कारण (प्रत्यय) कार्य्य युक्तओ बला चले ना]

किन्न एतेन क्रियावन्तः प्रत्यया इत्यादि विचारेण यस्माच्चक्षुरादीन् प्रतीत्य

प्रत्ययान् विज्ञानादयो भावा जायन्ते । तस्माच्चक्षुरादीनां प्रत्ययत्वं तेभ्यश्चोत्पादो वा ज्ञानादीनामिति । एतदप्ययुक्तमित्याह—

उत्पद्यते प्रतीत्येमानितीमे प्रत्ययाः किल ।
यावन्नोत्पद्यते इमे तावन्नाप्रत्ययाः कथम् ॥५॥

Beng. Trans. ইহার উপর নির্ভর করিয়া এই সকল উৎপন্ন হয় বলিয়া ইহার নাম প্রত্যয়। যেহেতু পদার্থ(ভাব) উৎপন্নই হয় না সেইজন্য ইহারা অপ্রত্যয় (কারণশূন্য) হইবে না কেন ?

Eng. Trans. A pratyaya is designated as such in as much as objects arise by depending on it. But as entities are never produced, why should they not be called uncaused ?

Candrakīrti—যদি চক্ষুরাদীন্ প্রত্যয়ান্ প্রতীত্য বিজ্ঞানমুত্পদ্যতে তেন অস্য ইমে প্রত্যয়াঃ উচ্যন্তে । ননু যাবত্তদ্বিজ্ঞানাখ্যং কার্যং নোত্পদ্যতে তাবদিমে চক্ষুরাদয়ঃ কথং নাপ্রত্যয়াঃ । **অপ্রত্যया एव इत्यभिप्रायाः ।** न चाप्रत्ययेभ्यः उत्पत्तिः शिकताभ्यः इव तैलस्य ।

চক্ষুরাদয়ঃ বিজ্ঞানস্য প্রত্যয়াঃ কল্প্যমানাঃ স্বতো বাস্য কল্পেরন্ অসতো বা ; সর্বথা ন যুক্তমিত্যাহ—

नैवासतः नैव सतः प्रत्ययोऽर्थस्य युज्यते ।
असतः प्रत्ययः कस्य सतश्च प्रत्ययेन किम् ॥६॥

Beng. Trans. সৎ বা অসৎ (অবিদ্যমান) পদার্থের প্রত্যয়পরীক্ষা অযৌক্তিক কারণ অসৎ (অবিদ্যমান) পদার্থের প্রত্যয় কোথায় আর সৎ পদার্থের প্রত্যয় বিবেচনায় কি ফল ?

Eng. Trans. The question of finding out the cause, with respect to everexisting and non-existing objects, is

illogical. If it is non-existing whose cause is to be found out ? And if it is ever-existing what is the use of finding out a cause ?

Candrakīrti—असतोऽर्थस्याविद्यमानस्य प्रत्ययकल्पनमसङ्गतम् । विद्यमानस्य वस्तुनः लब्धजन्मनो निष्फलैव प्रत्ययकल्पना ।

न सन्नासन्न सदसद्धर्मो निर्वर्तते यदा ।
कथं निर्वर्तको हेतुरेवं सति हि युज्यते ॥७॥

Beng. Trans. যদি হেতুর লক্ষণ করা হয় নির্বর্ত্ত্যকে অপেক্ষা করিয়া নির্বর্ত্তকরূপে তাহা হইলে সৎ (নিত্য) অসৎ (অনিত্য) সদসৎ (নিত্যানিত্য) ন সৎ ন অসৎ (না নিত্য না অনিত্য) প্রভৃতিস্থলে এই লক্ষণ কি করিয়া প্রযোজ্য হয় ?

Eng. Trans. If a 'Hetu' is defined as creating something in relation to the created, how can it be applicable in case of existing, non-existing, both existing and non-existing and one neither existing nor non-existing ?

Candrakīrti—तत्र निर्वर्तक उत्पादकः यदि निवर्त्यो धर्म्मो निवर्तते तमुत्पादकहेतुरूत्पादयेन्नतु निवर्तते सदसदुभयरूपस्य निवर्त्यस्याभावात्, तत्र सन्निवर्तते विद्यमानत्वात् असन्नापि अविद्यमानत्वात् । सदसन्नापि परस्परविरुद्धस्यैक्याभावात् उभयपक्षाभिहितदोषत्वाच्च । यत एव कार्यस्योत्पत्ति र्नास्ति हेतुप्रत्ययोप्यतो नास्ति ।

इदानीम् आलम्बनप्रत्ययनिषेधार्थमाह—

अनालम्बन एवायं सन् धर्म उपदिश्यते ।
अथानालम्बने धर्मे कुत आलम्बनं पुनः ॥८॥

Beng. Trans. নির্ব্বাণরূপ ধর্ম্ম অনালম্বন (অনন্যাশ্রয়ী) বলিয়া উপদিষ্ট হইয়াছে। (বিদ্যমান পদার্থের আলম্বন প্রত্যয়ের প্রয়োজন নাই কারণ ধর্ম্মের ব্যুৎপত্তির জন্য আলম্বন যদি পরিকল্পিত হয় সে আলম্বনের পূর্ব্বেই বিদ্যমান থাকে). এই অবস্থায় অনালম্বনরূপ ধর্ম্ম স্বতঃপ্রসিদ্ধ হইলে (স্বাত্মনা প্রসিদ্ধে) আলম্বনযোগে ইহার পরিকল্পনায় কি ফল ?

Eng. Trans. Nirvāṇa has been instructed (by Lord Buddha) to be non-depending on others. It thus bing selfevident what is the necessity of conceiving it as depending on others ?

Candrakīrti—कथं तर्हि सालम्बनाश्चित्तचैत्याः इति । प्राकृतमेतल्लक्षणं न पारमार्थिकम् इत्यदोषः ।

इदानीं समनन्तरप्रत्ययनिषेधार्थमाह—

अनुत्पन्नेषु धर्म्मेषु निरोधो नोपपद्यते ।
नानन्तरमतो युक्तं निरुद्धे प्रत्ययश्च कः ॥९॥

Beng. Trans. (বীজের পচনভাব হইলে অঙ্কুর জাত হয়) বীজনিরোধাদি উদাহরণ স্থলে, যে অঙ্কুররূপধর্ম্ম অনুৎপন্ন সে স্থলে নিরোধ উপপন্ন হয়না। অতএব সমনন্তর প্রত্যয় যুক্তিযুক্ত নয়। নিরোধ স্বীকার করিয়া লইলেও তাহার আবার কারণ হিসাবে কাহাকে কল্পনা করা হইবে ?

Eng. Trans. (In case of sprout growing out of the seed which rots away yielding to the growth of the sprout) where

sprout itsef is unborn (uncaused) the question of obstruction is not proved. Therefore Anantara pratyaya is not proper. And if obstruction is recognised however, what may be its cause ?

Candrakīrti—तेनानुत्पन्ने चाङ्कुरे बीजादीनां निरोध इष्यमानेऽप्युभयमेतदहेतुकमापद्यते इति नानन्तरमतो युक्तम् ।

इदानीमधिपतिप्रत्ययस्वरूपनिषेधार्थमाह—

भावानां निःस्वभावानां न सत्ता विद्यते यतः ।
सतीदमस्मिन् भवतीत्येतन्नैवोपपद्यते ॥१०॥

Beng. Trans. ভাবপদার্থ সকল (প্রতীত্যসমুৎপাদের দৃষ্টিতে বিচারিত হইলে) স্বভাবহীন, অতএব অস্তিত্বশূন্য । এই অবস্থায় 'তাহা হইলে ইহা হইবে' এই যুক্তি উপপন্ন নয় ।

Eng. Trans. Ever-existing objects (when judged in the light of Pratītya samutpāda) being devoid of selfnature are called non-existing. In that case the proposition—'this being so, that exists' cannot be established.

Candrakīrti—भावानां प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् स्वभावाभावे कुतस्तदेतदस्मिन्निति कारणत्वेन व्यवदिश्यते । कुतस्तद्यदिदम् कार्यत्वेन । तस्मान्नास्ति लक्षणतोपि प्रत्ययसिद्धिः ।

यथा च घटादिफलप्रवृत्तिरसती तथा प्रतिपादयन्नाह—

न च व्यस्तसमस्तेषु प्रत्ययेष्वस्ति तत् फलम् ।
प्रत्ययेभ्यः कथं तच्च भवेन्न प्रत्ययेषु यत् ॥११॥

Beng. Trans. ব্যস্ত (একৈক-তন্তুতূণীর বেমশর শলাকাদিতে) প্রত্যয়ে ফল থাকে না আবার সমুদিত প্রত্যয়েও ফল থাকে না (প্রত্যেক

অবয়বে অবিদ্যমান বলিয়া)। এই অবস্থায় যাহা প্রত্যয়ে সমুদিত ও ব্যস্তভাবে নাই সেই প্রত্যয় হইতে ফলোৎপত্তি কিরূপে সম্ভবপর ?

Eng. Trans. Effect remains not in the cause singly or in the totality of them. Hence how can an effect arise from a cause, where it did not remain ?

Candrakīrti—तत्र व्यस्तेषु तन्तुतूणीरवेमशरशलाकादिषु प्रत्ययः घटो नास्ति तत्रानुपलभ्यमानत्वात् कारणबहुत्वाच्च कार्यबहुत्वप्रसङ्गात्। समुदितेष्वपि नास्ति घटः प्रत्येकमवयवेष्वविद्यमानत्वात्, एकस्य कार्यस्य खण्डश उत्पत्ति-प्रसङ्गात्। तस्मात् फलाभावान्न सन्ति प्रत्ययाः।

अथासदपि तत्तेभ्यः प्रत्ययेभ्यः प्रवर्त्तते।
अप्रत्ययेभ्योपि कस्मान्नाभिप्रवर्त्तते फलम् ॥१२॥

Beng. Traus. আর প্রত্যয়ে অবিদ্যমান ফল প্রত্যয় হইতে জাত হউক, এইরূপ পক্ষ যদি স্বীকার করা হয়, তাহা হইলে অপ্রত্যয় হইতেও ফল প্রবর্ত্তিত হইবে না কেন ?

Eng. Trans. And if the effect (which is not found to exist in the cause) can be imagined as arising out of causes, then why should not the effect arise out of non-causes (অপ্রত্যয়) ?

[এইরূপ কল্পনায় কারণহীন কার্য্য হইয়া পড়ে, কিন্তু ইহা অসঙ্গত]

Candrakīrti—तस्मात् नास्ति फलप्रवृत्तिः स्वरूपतः।

यद्यन्यत् फलं स्यादन्य एव प्रत्ययस्तदा किं प्रत्ययेषु फलमस्ति नास्ति इति स्याच्चिन्ता। नास्ति तु व्यतिरिक्तं फलम्, किन्तर्हि प्रत्ययमयमेव इति,—

उच्यते—

ফলশ্চ প্রত্যয়ময়ং প্রত্যয়শ্চাস্বয়ংময়াঃ।
ফলমস্বয়ংময়েভ্য যত্তত্প্রত্যয়ময়ং কথম্ ॥১২॥

Beng. Trans. ফল হইল প্রত্যয়যুক্ত, (প্রত্যয়স্বভাব, প্রত্যয়বিকার) আবার প্রত্যয় সকল প্রত্যয়হীন (অপ্রত্যয় স্বভাব), তাহা হইলে অপ্রত্যয়স্বভাব প্রত্যয় হইতে জাত ফলকে কি করিয়া প্রত্যয়যুক্ত বলা চলে ?

Eng, Trans. An effect is of the nature of cause and a cause is by nature uncaused. How can an effect coming from an uncaused one be called as full of cause ?

Candrakīrti—অস্বয়ংময়া অপ্রত্যয়স্বভাবাইত্যর্থঃ। তন্তুময়ো হি পটঃ ইত্যুচ্যতে। পটাঃ যদি তন্তব এব স্বভাবসিদ্ধাঃ স্যুঃ। তে হি অংশুবিকারা ন স্বভাবসিদ্ধাঃ। ততশ্চ তেভ্যো স্বয়ংময়স্বভাবেভ্যঃ যত্ ফলং পটাখ্যং তত্ কথং তন্তুময়ং ভবিষ্যতি। তদুক্তং—

পটঃ কারণতঃ সিদ্ধম্ সিদ্ধং কারণমন্যতঃ।
সিদ্ধির্যস্য স্বতো নাস্তি তদন্যজ্জনয়েত্ কথম্ ॥ ইতি।

তস্মাত্—

ন প্রত্যয়ময়ং ফলম্ নাপ্রত্যয়ময়ং ফলম্।
সংবিদ্যতে, ফলাভাবাত্ প্রত্যয়াপ্রত্যয়াঃ কুতঃ ॥১৪॥

Beng. Trans. তাহা হইলে প্রত্যয়ময় ফলও নাই, প্রত্যয়হীন ফলও হইতে পারে না। ফলের অভাবে প্রত্যয় অপ্রত্যয়ের প্রসঙ্গ কোথা হইতে আসিবে ?

Eng. Trans. Thus effect is neither full of cause, nor

different from cause. In the absence of an effect therefore the problem of cause and non-cause cannot arise at all.

Candrakīrti—तस्मान्नास्ति भावानां स्वभावतः समुत्पत्तिरिति ।

मूलमध्यमककारिका

द्वितीय-प्रकरणम्

गतागत परीक्षा ।

यदि गतं स्यान्नियतन्तद्गते वाध्वजाते परिकल्प्यते, अगते गम्यमाने वा । सर्वथा न युज्यते इत्याह—

गतं न गम्यते तावदगतं नैव गम्यते ।
गतागतविनिर्मुक्तं गम्यमानं न गम्यते ॥१॥

Beng. Trans. যাহা অতিক্রান্ত হইয়াছে (গতম্) তাহা আর অতিক্রম করা হয় বলা চলেনা ; যাহাতে গমনক্রিয়াযুক্ত হয় নাই, তাহাও অতিক্রম করা হয় বলিয়া বলা চলে না, অতএব গত ও অগতাতিরিক্ত গম্যমানকেও অনতিক্রম্য বলা যাইতে পারে ।

Eng. Trans. A by-gone act of going, cannot be again called as going. An act where the act of going has not arisen can also not be called as 'going'. Outside the two alternatives a would-be-going cannot be called as 'gone'.

Candrakīrti—उपरतगमिक्रियमध्वजातं गतमित्युच्यते । आविश्यमानं गमिक्रियया वर्तमानं गम्यते इत्युच्यते ।

गम्यते एव गम्यमान मिह हि—

चेष्टा यत्र गतिस्तत्र गम्यमाने च सा यतः।
न गते नागते चेष्टा गम्यमाने गतिस्ततः ॥२॥

Beng. Trans. যেস্থলে গমনানুকূল (চরণোৎক্ষেপাদি) চেষ্টা থাকে সেস্থলে গতি থাকে। সেই চেষ্টা কেবলমাত্র গম্যমানেই থাকে কিন্তু ইহা গত (অতিক্রান্ত গমন ব্যাপার) বা অগত (অনাক্রান্ত গমন ব্যাপার) ব্যাপারে থাকে না। [অতএব গম্যমানকেই 'গম্যতে' বলা চলে]

Eng. Trans. It is argued that the act of going remains in a case where there is attempt like placing of footsteps. As it exists neither in the bygone act nor in the un-attempted going, it may be said that would-be-going, can be called as 'gone'.

Candrakīrti—चेष्टा चरणोत्क्षेपलक्षणा। यतो वर्जतो गन्तुर्यत्र देशे चेष्टा गतिस्तत्रैव देशे सा च चेष्टा वा गतेऽध्वनि सम्भवति नाप्यगते किन्तु गम्यमाने एव, ततश्च गम्यमाने गतिः।

एवमपि परिकल्प्यमाने गम्यमानं न गम्यते इति आह—

गम्यमानस्य गमनं कथं नामोपपत्स्यते।
गम्यमानं (ने) द्विगमनं यदा नैवोपपद्यते ॥३॥

Beng. Trans. গম্যমানে দুইবার গমন যতক্ষণ পর্য্যন্ত না উপপন্ন হয় ততক্ষণ গম্যমানের গমন কি করিরা প্রতিপন্ন করা যায় ?

Eng. Trans. How can the act of going of the would-be-going be possible if the twice going of the would-be-going is not proved?

Candrakīrti—एकस्याः गमिक्रियायाः गम्यमानमित्यत्रोपयुज्यत्वाद्द्वितीयाया अभावाच्च गम्यते इत्ययं व्यपदेशो विना गमनेन यदा नैवोपपद्यते तदा गम्यमानं गम्यते इति परिपूर्णो वाक्यार्थो नास्तीत्यभिप्रायः ।

अथ गम्यते इत्यत्रैव गमिक्रियासम्बन्ध इष्यते । एवं सति गम्यमानव्यपदेशो नास्ति क्रियासम्बन्ध इति न परिपूर्णता वाक्यर्थस्य इत्याह—

गम्यमानस्य गमनं यस्य, तस्य प्रसज्यते ।
ऋते गते गम्यमानं गम्यमानं हि गम्यते ॥४॥

Beng. Trans. যে মতবাদীর মতে 'গম্যমানই গমন' তাহাদের পক্ষে গতি বিনাই 'গম্যমান' এইরূপ প্রয়োগ হয় ; এবং গমন গতি-রহিত হইয়া পরে কারণ গম্যমানই 'গম্যতে' ব্যপদেশ লাভ করে ।

Eng. Trans. The propounders of the theory who urge that would-be-going is nothing other than act of going, subscribe to the error that in that case without the act of going, the would-be-going becomes possible in as much as the would-be-going is explained as equivalent to going.

अथोभयत्रापि क्रियासम्बन्ध इष्यते । गम्यमाने गम्यते इत्यत्र च —

गम्यमानस्य गमने प्रसक्तं गमनद्वयम् ।
येन तद्गम्यमानं च यच्च ते गमनं पुनः ॥५॥

Beng. Trans. গম্যমানকে যদি গমন বলিয়া স্বীকার করিয়া লওয়া হয় তাহা হইলে দুইটী গমনের কল্পনা করিতে হয়—একটী হইল সেই গমন যাহার সহিত যোগে পথ গম্যমান ব্যপদেশ লাভ করে, আর দ্বিতীয়টী হইল সেই গমন যাহা গম্যমানের আধার—যাহাদ্বারা পথ অতিক্রম করা হয় ।

Eng. Trans. In the proposition that would-be-going is equivalent to act of going the two procedures of going come in—one going is that by contact with which the path becomes designated as would-be-going and another by resorting to which the path is actually traversed.

Candrakīrti—येन गमनेन योगाद्गम्यमानव्यपदेशं प्रतिलभतेऽध्वा तदेकं गमनम्। तत्र गमनेऽधिकरणभूते द्वितीयं गमनं येन स गम्यते।

भवतु गमनद्वयं को दोष इति चेत्। अयं दोषो। यस्मात्—

द्वौ गन्तारौ प्रसज्येते प्रसक्ते गमनद्वये।

किं पुनः कारणाद्वयप्रसङ्ग इत्याह—

गन्तारं हि तिरस्कृत्य गमनं नोपपद्यते ॥६॥

Beng. Trans. দুইটী গমন (গম্যমানকে গমন স্বীকার করিলে) হইলে দুইটী গন্তা কল্পনা করিতে হয় কারণ গন্তাকে বাদ দিয়া গমন উপপন্ন হইতে পারে না।

Eng. Trans. In as much as act of going is not possible without an agent, in the present supposition if two acts of going are to be assumed then there must also be imagined two agents (in the same act of going).

Candrakīrti—नास्ति चक्रस्मिन् एव गच्छति देवदत्ते द्वितीयः कर्त्तेति। अतः कर्तृद्वयाभावान्नास्ति गमनद्वयं, ततश्च गम्यमानं गम्यते इति नोपपद्यते।

यद्यप्येवं तथापि गन्तरि देवदत्ते गमनमुपलभ्यते देवदत्तो गच्छतीति व्यपदेशात् ततश्चिरोद्यत एव गमनं गमनाश्रयगन्तृसद्भावादुच्यते। स्यादेवं यदि गमनाश्रयो गन्ता स्यात्, कथमित्याह—

गन्तारञ्च तिरङ्कृत्य गमनं नोपपद्यते ।
गमनेऽसति गन्ताथ कुत एव भविष्यति ॥७॥

Beng. Trans. গন্তাকে বাদ দিয়া গমন যদি সিদ্ধ না হয় তাহা হইলে যে স্থলে গমনই নাই সে স্থলে গন্তা কোথা হইতে আসিবে ? [অতএব গমন নাই বলিতে হইবে]

Eng. Trans. An act of going is not possible in the absence of the agent. And where the act is absent how can the idea of agent of the act come in?

स्याद्गमनं यदि गच्छतीत्येव व्यवदेशः स्याद्यस्मात्—

गन्ता न गच्छति तावद्गन्ता नैव गच्छति ।
अन्यो गन्तुरगन्तुश्च कस्तृतीयो हि गच्छति ॥८॥

Ben. Trans. গন্তা (যে পথ অতিক্রম করিয়াছে) যায় একথা বলা চলে না ; আর অগন্তা (গমনক্রিয়ারহিত) যায় একথাও অচল। অতএব গন্তা ও অগন্তা ব্যতিরিক্ত তৃতীয় আর কে আছে যাহাকে গচ্ছতি বলা চলে ? [অতএব গমন নাই]

Eng. Trans. One who has already gone cannot be said to be as 'going,' one who has got no connection with action conducive to going can also not be said as going. In such a case who is the third one (other than these two) who can be said as going ?

अत्राह—गन्तैव गच्छति । एतदप्यसत् किं कारणं यस्मात्—

গন্তা তাবদ্গচ্ছতীতি কথমেবোপপত্স্যতে।
গমনেন বিনা গন্তা যদা নৈবোপপদ্যতে ॥৯॥

Beng. Trans. গমন ব্যতীত গন্তা যখন উপপন্ন হয় না তখন 'গন্তা গচ্ছতি' প্রয়োগ কি করিয়া সিদ্ধ হয় ?

Eng. Trans. As a goer cannot have the designation as such in the absence of the act of going, how can the proposition—'the goer is going' be called reasonable ?

Candrakīrti—গন্তা গচ্ছতীত্যত্র বাক্যে একৈব গমিক্রিয়া তস্যা চ গচ্ছতীতি ব্যপদিশ্যতে। গন্তেতি তু ব্যপদেশে নাস্তি গমিক্রিয়েতি। গমনেন বিনা গন্তাऽগচ্ছন্ গন্তেতি যদা ন সম্ভবতি তদা গন্তা গচ্ছতীতি ন যুজ্যতে।

অথ গতিযোগাত্ সগতিক এব গন্তা তথাপি দ্বিতীয়গমিক্রিয়াভাবাত্ গচ্ছতীতি ব্যপদেশো ন স্যাদিত্যাহ—

পক্ষো গন্তা গচ্ছতীতি যস্য তত্য প্রসজ্যতে।
গমনেন বিনা গন্তা গন্তুর্গমনমিচ্ছতঃ ॥১০॥

Beng. Trans. যে মতাবলম্বীর পক্ষে 'গতি ক্রিয়ার যোগে গন্তা' হয় তাহাদের মতেও গমনাভিলাষী গন্তার গমনবিনাই গচ্ছতি প্রয়োগ হয়। [অতএব 'গন্তা গচ্ছতি' যুক্তিযুক্ত নয়]

Eng. Trans. Those who are of opinion that a goer derives his name in connection with the act of going, fall under the error for even according to them a goer can be said as going without the act of going.

Candrakīrti—यस्य वादिनो गमिक्रियायोगादेव गन्तेति पक्षः, तस्य गन्तुर्गमनमिच्छतः स (गमन)गन्तृव्यपदेशाद्गमनेन विना गन्ता गच्छतीति स्यात् द्वितीयगमिक्रियाभावादतो गन्ता गच्छतीति न युज्यते। गच्छतीत्येतस्यार्थे गन्तेति शब्दो गमनेन विना गन्तेत्यत्र वाक्ये।

अथ उभयत्रापि गतियोग इष्यते गन्ता गच्छतीति—एवमपि

गमने द्वे प्रसज्येते गन्ता यद्युत गच्छति।
गन्तेति चोच्यते येन गन्ता सोऽन्यच्च गच्छति ॥११॥

Beng. Trans. উভয়ক্ষেত্রেই যদি গতি যোগ হইয়া থাকে (গন্তা গচ্ছতি স্থলে) তাহা হইলে দুইটী গমন আসিয়া পড়ে—একটী গমন যাহার যোগে গমনকারী গন্তাপদাভিধেয় হয়। গন্তা হইয়া পরে যে গমন ক্রিয়া করে তাহা হইল দ্বিতীয় গমন। [অতএব গচ্ছতি প্রয়োগ হইতে পারে না]

Eng. Trans. If however the act of going be connected in both the cases, then two acts come in—one through contact with which a goer derives its name and another which the goer performs at the time of going.

Candrakīrti—येन गमनेन योगात् गन्तेत्युच्यते व्यपदिश्यते तदेकं गमनं, गन्ता भवन् यच्च गच्छति यां च गतिक्रियां करोति तदेतद्गमनद्वयं प्रसक्तमतो गन्तृद्वयप्रसङ्ग इति पूर्ववद्दूषणं वक्तव्यम्। तस्मान्नास्ति गच्छतीति व्यपदेशः।

स्याद्गमनं यदि गमनारम्भ एव स्यात्—यस्मात्—

गते नारभ्यते गन्तुं गन्तुं नारभ्यतेऽगते।
नारभ्यते गम्यमाने गन्तुमारभ्यते कुह ॥१२॥

Beng. Trans. যে উপরতগমন (গত) তাহার মধ্যে গমনারম্ভ

থাকে না, যে গমন করে নাই সে স্থলেও আরম্ভের অভাব। আর গম্যমানেও তাহাই (কর্তৃদ্বয়ের প্রসঙ্গ হইয়া পড়ে); অতএব কোথায় গমনারম্ভ থাকিতে পারে ?—

Eng. Trans. One who is already gone does not possess what is called 'the attempt to go' and one who is not gone also does not go so. It is also absent in the case of would-be-going. So where will the 'attempt-to-go' remain ?

যথা চ গমনং ন সম্ভবতি তথা প্রতিপাদয়ন্নাহ—

ন পূর্বং গমনারম্ভাৎ গম্যমানং ন বা গতম্।
যত্রারভ্যেত গমনমগতে গম্যমানে ক্বতঃ ॥১২॥

Beng. Trans. দেবদত্তাদির গমনারম্ভের পূর্ব্বে গম্যমান বা গত কোন পথ নাই যেস্থলে গমন আরম্ভ করা যাইতে পারে। অতএব গত ও গম্যমানের অভাবে গমন কোথা হইতে আসিবে ?

Eng. Trans. Before the attempt of going (on the part of a person), there is not a path which is traversed or would be traversed (where attempt of going may be made). So in the absence in these two—gone and would-be-going, the attempt to go is not possible to remain in a path which is not traversed.

Candrakīrti—অনুপজাতগমিক্রিয়মনারব্ধগমিক্রিয়মগতং তত্র গমনারম্ভ ইত্যসংবদ্ধমেতদিতি।

যদা তু গমিক্রিয়াপ্রারম্ভ এব নাস্তি তদা—

गतं किं गम्यमानं किमगतं किं विकल्प्यते ।
अदृश्यमान आरम्भे गमनस्यैव सर्वथा ॥१४॥

Beng. Trans. গমনের আরম্ভই যখন নাই তখন গত, গম্যমান বা অগতের পরিকল্পনা নিষ্প্রয়োজন।

Eng. Trans. In the absence of the attempt of going (প্রারম্ভ) what is the use of imagination of gone, not-gone and would-be-going ?

विद्यते एव गमनं तत्प्रतिपत्तिसद्भावात् । स्याद्गमनं यदि तत्प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । कथमिहेदं स्थानं गन्तुरगन्तु स्तदन्यस्य वा परिकल्प्येत सर्वथा च न युज्यत इत्याह—

गन्ता न तिष्ठति तावद्गन्ता नैव तिष्ठति ।
अन्यो गन्तुरगन्तुश्च कस्तृतीयोऽथ तिष्ठति ॥१५॥

Beng. Trans. গন্তা (গমনকারী) অবস্থান করে, এরূপ প্রয়োগ হয় না। গতিহীন লোক অবস্থান করে এরূপ প্রয়োগও হয় না। আর গন্তা ও অগন্তা ব্যতিরিক্ত তৃতীয় আর কে আছে যাহাকে অবস্থান করে (তিষ্ঠতি) বলিয়া বলা চলে ?

Eng. Trans. A goer can not be described as staying (in a certain place), nor can it be said that a non-goer is staying and in the absence of the two who is the third party who can be said as staying ?

Candrakīrti—अगन्तापि न तिष्ठति । स हि तिष्ठत्येव, तत किमपरया स्थित्या प्रयोजनम्, एकया स्थित्याऽगन्ता अपरया तिष्ठतीति स्थितिद्वयप्रसङ्गात् स्यातृद्वयप्रसङ्गः ।

গন্তা ন তিষ্ঠতি, যস্মাৎ—

গন্তা তাবত্তিষ্ঠতীতি কথমেবোপপত্স্যতে।
গমনেন বিনা গন্তা যদা নৈবোপপদ্যতে ॥১৬॥

Beng. Trans. যদি কল্পনা করা হয় যে 'গন্তা তিষ্ঠতি' তাহাও সম্ভবপর নয়। গমন বিনা গন্তা যখন উপপন্ন হয় না, তখন 'গন্তা তিষ্ঠতি' এইরূপ প্রয়োগ কি করিয়া হইতে পারে?

Eng. Trans. In as much as one cannot be termed as 'goer' in the absence of going, how can then it be said that 'goer' is staying?

[যখন বলা হয় 'তিষ্ঠতি' তখন ইহার স্থিতি-বিরোধী গমন নাই, আর গমন ব্যতিরেকে গন্তৃত্ব সিদ্ধ হয় না। অতএব গন্তা তিষ্ঠতি প্রয়োগ অসিদ্ধ।]

গমনের নিবৃত্তি হয় বলিয়া নিবৃত্তিকে উপলক্ষ্য করিয়া 'গমন' স্বীকার করা হইলে তদ্বিষয়ে বক্তব্য এই যে গমন থাকিলে গমনের নিবৃত্তি হইতে পারে, কিন্তু নিবৃত্তিই নাই, কারণ—

ন তিষ্ঠতি গম্যমানাত্ ন গতান্নাগতাদপি।
গমনং সংপ্রবৃত্তিশ্চ নিবৃত্তিশ্চ গতেঃ সমা ॥১৭॥

Beng. Trans. গতির অভাবে গন্তা গত পথ হইতে, অগত (অনতিক্রান্ত) পথ হইতে, আর (অনুপলব্ধ গমনক্রিয়া অভাবে) গম্যমান পথ হইতে নিবৃত্ত হয় না। [অতএব গতিনিবৃত্তি নাই]। (প্রতিদ্বন্দ্বী সদ্ভাববশতঃ) স্থিতি কল্পনা করিয়া যদি গমন সিদ্ধ হয় তাহাও পূর্ববর্ণিত উপায়ে দূষিত॥

Eng. Trans. In the absence of going, the goer is not desisted from the path which is gone, not-gone and would-be-gone. The going which is proposed to be described in connection with staying is also defective in the same way.

Candrakīrti—गन्ता गतादध्वनो न निवर्त्तते गत्यभावात्। अगतादपि गत्यभावादेव, गम्यमानादपि न निवर्त्तते तदनुपलब्धेर्गमिक्रियाभावाच्च। तस्मान्न गतिनिवृत्तिरिति।

अत्र हि यद्गमनं स्थितिसिद्धये वर्णितम् तद्गत्या समं गतिदूषणेन तुल्यमित्यर्थः। यथा गन्ता न तिष्ठति तावदित्यादिना गतिप्रसिद्धये स्थितेर्हेतुत्वेनोपात्ताया दूषणमुक्तमेवमिहापि स्थितिप्रसिद्धये गमनहेतुत्वेनोपात्तस्य स्थाता न गच्छतीत्यादिना श्लोकद्वयपाठपरिवर्त्तेन दूषणं वक्तव्यमिति नास्ति गमनं, तदभावात् प्रतिद्वन्द्विनी स्थितिरपीति।

गमन गन्ता व्यतिरेके वा अव्यतिरेके सम्भवपर नय—

यदेव गमनं गन्ता स एवेति न युज्यते।
अन्य एव पुन र्गन्ता गतेरिति न युज्यते ॥१८॥

Beng. Trans. याहाई गमन ताहाई यदि गन्ता हय ताहा युक्तियुक्त नय। एक गतिर अन्य गन्ता हईते पारे ना।

Eng. Trans. The goer cannot be same with the act of going for a separate agent (goer) cannot be imagined for the same act of going.

कथं पुनर्न युज्यते इत्याह—

যদেব গমনং গন্তা স এব হি ভবেদ্যদি।
একীভাবঃ প্রসজ্যেত কর্ত্তুঃ কর্ম্মণ এব চ ॥১৯॥

Beng. Trans. গমনই যদি গন্তা হয় তাহা হইলে কর্ত্তা ও কর্ম্মের একীভাব (একত্ব) হইয়া পড়ে (কর্ত্তা ও ক্রিয়ার ব্যবধান থাকে না)।

Eng. Trans. If the act of going be described as identical with the goer, then the distinction between the agent and the deed goes away (but it is impossible).

Candrakīrti—ন চ চ্ছিদিক্রিয়ায়াশ্ছেত্তুশ্চৈকত্বম্। অতো যদেব গমনং স এব গন্তেতি ন যুজ্যতে।

অন্যত্বমপি গন্তৃগমনয়োর্যথা নাস্তি তথা প্রতিপাদয়ন্নাহ—

অন্য এব পুনর্গন্তা গতের্যদি বিকল্প্যতে।
গমনং স্যাদৃতে গন্তু র্গন্তা স্যাদ্গমনাদৃতে। ২০॥

Ben. Trans. যদি এইরূপ বিকল্পে করা হয় যে গতি এক আর গন্তা অন্য তাহা হইলে গন্তা ব্যতিরেকেই গমন হয় আর গমন ব্যতিরেকেও গন্তা হইতে পারে।

Eng. Trans. If it is supposed that the act of going is one thing, while the goer is another quite different from it, then the act of going may occur even in the absence of goer and vice versa.

একীভাবেন বা সিদ্ধি র্নানাভাবেন বা যয়োঃ।
ন বিদ্যতে তয়োঃ সিদ্ধিঃ কথং নু খলু বিদ্যতে ॥২১॥

Beng. Trans. যে গন্তৃ-গমনের একীভাবে (যাহা গন্তা তাহাই গমন এই ভাবে) সিদ্ধি নাই, ব্যস্তভাবে (গন্তা গমন হইতে ভিন্ন

এই ভাবে) সিদ্ধি নাই, তাহাদের (গন্তৃ-গমনের) অন্য কোন প্রকারে সিদ্ধি সম্ভবপর হইতে পারে ? [অতএব গন্তৃ-গমনের সিদ্ধি হয় না]

Eng. Trans. How can the problem of goer and the act of going be solved in a different way, which cannot be solved when considered as identieal or different?

যেরূপ 'বক্তা বাচং ভাষতে', 'কর্ত্তা ক্রিয়াং করোতি' প্রসিদ্ধ, তদ্রূপ যে গতির যোগে ব্যক্তিকে গন্তা বলা হয় গন্তা সেই গতিই সম্পাদন করে এইরূপ কল্পনা হইলেও তাহা সাম্প্রত নয়। কারণ—

गत्या ययोच्यते गन्ता गतिं तां स न गच्छति ।
यस्मान्न गतिपूर्वोस्ति, कश्चित् किञ्चिद्धि गच्छति ॥२२॥

Beng. Trans. যে গতির যোগে ব্যক্তিকে গন্তা বলা হয়, সে গতিকে গন্তা গমন করে না, কারণ যদি গন্তা গতির পূর্ব্বে সিদ্ধ হয় তাহা হইলে সেই গতিকে গমন করা সম্ভব, যেহেতু দেবদত্তাদি কোন কোন ব্যক্তি প্রায় নগরাদিতেই গমন করে।

Eng. Trans. A goer does not perform the very act of going, through contact with which he is designated as goer. It is only possible for the goer to perform the act of going provided the goer exists before the act of going. It is generally seen that persons like Devadatta go to the cities and villages.

Candrakīrti—कश्चिद्देवदत्तः किञ्चिदर्थान्तरभूतं ग्रामं नगरं वा गच्छतीति दृष्टम्। न चैवं यया गत्या गन्तेत्युच्यते तस्याः पूर्वं सिद्धिरूपो गतिनिरपेक्षो गन्ता नामास्ति यस्तां गच्छेत्।

অথ মন্যসে যয়া গত্যা গন্তেত্যভিব্যজ্যতে তামেবাসৌ ন গচ্ছতি। কিন্তর্হি ততোঽন্যাং গতিমিতি। এতদপ্যসদ্যস্মাৎ—

গত্যা যয়োচ্যতে গন্তা ততোঽন্যাং স ন গচ্ছতি।
গতী দ্বে নোপপদ্যেতে যস্মাদেকঃ (কে)প্রগচ্ছতি ॥২৩॥

Beng. Trans. যে গতিকে আশ্রয় করিয়া কোন ব্যক্তি গন্তা বলিয়া অভিহিত হয় গন্তা সেই গতি ভিন্ন অন্য গতিতে প্রসক্ত হইতে পারে না। তাহা কল্পিত হইলে দুইটী গতি আসিয়া পড়ে এবং এক গন্তায় দুইটী গতি কল্পিত হইতে পারে না।

Eng. Trans. If it is imagined that the goer indulges in an action other than that through contact with which he is designated as such (goer), that also becomes improper for in that case two acts of going come in. The two acts cannot be imagined in the same agent.

সদ্ভূতো গমনং গন্তা ত্রিপ্রকারং ন গচ্ছতি।
নাসদ্ভূতোপি গমনং ত্রিপ্রকারং স গচ্ছতি ॥২৪॥

Beng. Trans. অতএব দেখা যাইতেছে যে গমিক্রিয়াযুক্ত 'সদ্ভূত গন্তা', 'অসদ্ভূত' গমিক্রিয়ারহিতগন্তা গন্তা, সদ্ভূত, অসদ্ভূত ও সদসদ্ভূত ত্রিপ্রকার গমন করিতে পারে না।

Eng. Trans. Thus it comes to this that a goer with the act of going or devoid of that act of going cannot go in anyone of the three ways.

যতশ্চৈবং গন্তৃগন্তব্যগমনানি বিচার্যমাণানি ন সন্তি—

गमनं (सद्) सद्भूतः त्रिप्रकारं न गच्छति।
तस्माद्गतिश्च गन्ता च गन्तव्यं च न विद्यते ॥२५॥

Beng. Trans. সদসদ্ভূত অর্থাৎ গতিক্রিয়াযুক্ত এবং গতিক্রিয়া-রহিত গন্তা সদ্ভূত, অসদ্ভূত ও সদসদ্ভূত তিনপ্রকার গমন করিতে পারে না। এইরূপে যেহেতু গন্তৃ, গন্তব্য ও গমন বিচার্য্যমাণ নয়, অতএব গতি, গন্তা ও গন্তব্য নাই।

Eng. Trans. A goer both with and without the act of going cannot perform the three types of the act of going. Thus in as much as the goer, the way to be gone and the act of going do not come within the the view of discussion, neither the act of going, nor the goer, nor the way to be gone exists.

चक्षुरादीन्द्रिय-परीक्षा नाम तृतीय-प्रकरणम्

यद्यपि गतिश्च गन्ता च गन्तव्यञ्च न विद्यते तथापि प्रवचनसिद्धयपेक्षया द्रष्टृदृष्टव्यदर्शनादीनामस्तित्वमास्थेयम्। तथा चाभिधर्मे उच्यते—

दर्शनं श्रवणं घ्राणं रसनं स्पर्शनं मनः।
इन्द्रियाणि षड़् तेषां दृष्टव्यादीनि गोचरः ॥१॥

Beng. Trans. চক্ষু, কর্ণ, নাসিকা, জিহ্বা, ত্বক ও মন, এই ৬টী ইন্দ্রিয়। দর্শন, শ্রবণ প্রভৃতি যথাক্রমে ইহাদের কর্ম্ম (গোচর)।

Eng. Trans. Eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin and mind are the six senses having their corresponding actions as seeing, hearing, tasting, touching and thinking.

Candrakīrti—दर्शनादीनि न सन्ति। पश्यतीति दर्शनम् चक्षुस्तस्य च रूपं विषयत्वनोपदिश्यते। यथा दर्शनं रूपं न पश्यति तथा प्रतिपादयन्नाह—

स्वमात्मानं दर्शनं हि तत्तमेव न पश्यति।
न पश्यति यदात्मानं कथं द्रक्ष्यति तत् परान् ॥२॥

Beng. Trans. দর্শন (চক্ষু) নিজকে দেখিতে পায় না (ক্রিয়া-বিরোধের জন্য)। নিজকে যদি দর্শন দেখিতে না পারে তাহা হইলে ইহা পরকে দেখিবে কি করিয়া ? [অতএব দর্শন নাই]

Eng. Trans. The eye cannot see its own self and if it cannot see itself, how can it expect to see others?

Candrakīrti—यद्यपि स्वात्मानं दर्शनं न पश्यति, तथापि अग्निवत् परान् द्रक्ष्यति। तथाह्यग्निः परात्मानमेव दहति न स्वात्मानं, एवं दर्शनं परानेव द्रक्ष्यति न स्वात्मानमिति। एतदप्ययुक्तम्, यस्मात्—

न पर्याप्तोऽग्निदृष्टान्तो दर्शनस्य प्रसिद्धये।
सदर्शनः स प्रत्युक्तः गम्यमानगतागतैः ॥३॥

Beng. Trans. দর্শনের সিদ্ধির জন্য অগ্নির দৃষ্টান্ত পর্য্যাপ্ত নয়, কারণ পূর্ব্বোক্ত গতাগতগম্যমানাদির ন্যায় আলোচ্য অগ্নির দৃষ্টান্তও দূষিত।

Eng. Trans. The illustration of fire (which though does not burn itself yet is in a position to burn others), though it may be adduced for proving the case of seeing, is not

sufficient, for, like the previous illustration (of gone, not-gone and would-be-going) this illustration is also faulty.

Candrakīrti—यथा गतं न गम्यते नागतं न गम्यमानमेवमग्निनापि दग्धं न दह्यते, ना दग्धं दह्यते इत्यादिना समं वाच्यम् ।

नादृपश्यमानं भवति यदा किंचन दर्शनम् ।
दर्शनं पश्यतीत्येवं कथमेतत्तु युज्यते ॥४॥

Beng. Trans. যেরূপ দর্শন নিজকে দেখিতে পারেনা, সেইরূপ পরকেও দেখিতে পারেনা। এমতাবস্থায় 'পশ্যতীতি দর্শন' রূপ ব্যাখ্যা কি করিয়া সঙ্গত ?

Eng. Trans. When the eye can see neither it's ownself nor others how can it be explained that an eye is called (as eye) because it sees ?

Candrakīrti—यदा चैवमपश्यन्न किंचिद्दर्शनं भवति, तदानीमपश्यतो दर्शनत्वायोगात् स्तम्भादिवत् पश्यतीति दर्शनमिति व्यपदेशो न युज्यते ।

इह पश्यतीति दर्शनमित्युच्यमाने दर्शनक्रियायाः दर्शनस्वभावस्य वा चक्षुषः सम्बन्धः परिकल्प्येत, अदर्शनस्वभावस्य वा । उभयथा न युज्यते इत्याह—

पश्यति दर्शनं नैव नैव पश्यत्यदर्शनम् ।
व्याख्यातो दर्शनेनैव द्रष्टा चाप्युपगम्यताम् ॥५॥

Beng. Trans. দর্শনস্বভাবযুক্ত দৃশ্ ক্রিয়াযুক্ত ব্যক্তির পুনরায় দর্শনরূপ ক্রিয়ার সহিত যোগ হইতে পারেনা (তাহা হইলে দুইটী দর্শনের প্রসঙ্গ ও দুইটী দর্শন ক্রিয়া আসিয়া পড়ে) ; দর্শনক্রিয়ারহিত ও 'দেখিতেছে' এরূপ বলা চলেনা। দর্শন প্রসঙ্গে যে ন্যায় অবলম্বন

করিয়া দর্শনের অসিদ্ধত্ব প্রমাণিত হইয়াছে, দ্রষ্টার ব্যাপারেও সেইরূপ ন্যায় অবলম্বন করিয়া দ্রষ্টার অসিদ্ধত্ব প্রমাণিত করিতে হইবে।

Eng. Trans. A man already seeing something cannot be further said as 'seeing' again, nor can the word 'seeing' be applied to one who does not see, and by the application of the same logic, the non-existence of the person seeing can be proved.

द्रष्टा नास्ति तिरस्कृत्यातिरस्कृत्य च दर्शनम्।
द्रष्टव्यं दर्शनं चैव द्रष्टर्य्यसति ते कुतः ॥६॥

Beng. Trans. দর্শনকে উপেক্ষা করিয়া বা না করিয়া দ্রষ্টা থাকিতে পারেনা আর দ্রষ্টার অভাবে দ্রষ্টব্য ও দর্শন কোথা হইতে আসিবে ?

Eng. Trans. A person seeing cannot remain either with reference to seeing or without reference to seeing and in the absence of the person to see when will come the act of seeing and the object of seeing ?

Candrakīrti—इह द्रष्टा नाम कश्चित् यदि स्यात् स दर्शनसापेक्षो वा स्यात् निरपेक्षो वा। तत्र यदि दर्शनसापेक्षोऽतिरस्कृत्य दर्शनमिष्यते, तदा सिद्धस्य वा दर्शनापेक्षा स्यादसिद्धस्य वा। तत्र सिद्धो द्रष्टा नहि दर्शनमपेक्षते, किं सिद्धस्य सतो द्रष्टुः पुनर्दर्शनापेक्षया, न हि सिद्धं पुनरपि साध्यते। अथासिद्धोऽपेक्षेत असिद्धत्वाद्वन्ध्यासुतवद्दर्शनं नापेक्षते।

विद्यते एव द्रष्टव्यदर्शने तत्कार्य्यसद्भावात्—तत्र

प्रतीत्य मातापितरौ यथोक्तः पुत्रसम्भवः।
चक्षुरूपे प्रतीत्यैवमुक्तो विज्ञानसम्भवः ॥७॥

Beng. Trans. মাতা ও পিতার প্রতীতি (জ্ঞান) হইতে যেরূপ পুত্র-সম্ভাব্যতা বিচারিত হয় সেইরূপ দ্রষ্টব্য ও দর্শনের প্রতীতি হইতে বিজ্ঞানের উৎপাদ কল্পনা করা হয়।

Eng. Trans. Vijñānas arise out of knowledge of seeing and the object of seeing as the knowledge of the son arises out of the knowledge of parents.

Candrakīrti—द्रष्टव्यं दर्शनं च प्रतीत्य विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। त्रयाणां संनिपातात् सास्रवस्पर्शः ; स्पर्शसहजा वेदना, तत् प्रत्यया तृष्णेति। एवं चत्वार्यपि भवाङ्गानि द्रष्टव्यदर्शनहेतुकानि विद्यन्ते। तस्मात्कार्यसद्भावाद्द्रष्टव्य-दर्शने विद्येते इति।

उच्यते, स्यातामेते यदि विज्ञानादिचतुष्टयमेव स्याद्यस्मात्—

द्रष्टव्यदर्शनाभावाद्विज्ञानादि चतुष्टयम्। (नास्ति)
तदा उपादानादीनि भविष्यन्ति पुनः कथम् ॥८॥

Beng. Trans. দ্রষ্টব্য ও দর্শনের অভাবে বিজ্ঞানাদি চতুষ্টয় (বিজ্ঞান, স্পর্শ, বেদনা ও তৃষ্ণা) নাই। আর বিজ্ঞানাদির অভাবে কি করিয়া উপাদানাদি সিদ্ধ হইতে পারে? (অতএব উপাদানাদি নাই।)

Eng. Trans. In the absence of the object to be seen and the act of seeing vijñānas, touch, pain and hankering do not exist. In such a case how can the elements be proved?

व्याख्यातं श्रवणं घ्राणं रसनं स्पर्शनं मनः ।
दर्शनेनैव जानीयाच्छ्रोत्र श्रोतव्यकादि च ॥९॥

Beng. Trans. দর্শনের স্বরূপ প্রভৃতি ব্যাখ্যার শৈলী অবলম্বন করিয়া শ্রবণ, ঘ্রাণ, রসন, স্পর্শন ও মনের ব্যাখ্যা অনুরূপ উপায়ে করা যাইতে পারে।

Eng. Trans. .By the application of the same process of logic, in the same way, explanation is possible of ear, nose, tongue, skin and mind.

स्कन्धपरीक्षा नाम चतुर्थप्रकरणम्

रूपस्कन्धमधिकृत्याह—

रूपकारणनिर्मुक्तं न रूपमुपलभ्यते ।
रूपेणापि न निर्मुक्तं दृश्यते रूपकारणम् ॥१॥

Beng. Trans. (রূপ ভৌতিক—তাহার কারণ চারিটী মহাভূত) সেই রূপকারণ ব্যতিরিক্ত পৃথগ্‌ভূত ভৌতিকরূপ (রূপ, রস, গন্ধ, স্পর্শ ও শব্দ) পাওয়া যায় না। অথচ রূপবিনির্ম্মুক্ত রূপ হইতে পৃথক রূপকারণ দেখা যায় না।

Eng. Trans. Separate elementary form, taste, smell, touch and sound are not found outside the four elements of Rūpa (form). And it is a fact that a cause of form apart from the form cannot be found.

तदेतत् प्रतिज्ञाद्वयं प्रसाधयितुकाम आह—

रूपकारणनिर्मुक्ते रूपे रूपं प्रसज्यते ।
आहेतुको न चास्त्यर्थः कश्चिदाहेतुकः क्वचित् ॥२॥

Beng. Trans. রূপকারণবহির্ভূত রূপে রূপকল্পনা কারণহীন হইয়া পড়ে। অতএব অহেতুকত্বদোষ প্রসঙ্গের জন্য রূপকারণমুক্ত রূপের কল্পনা অনুচিত।

[চতুর্মহাভূতাতিরিক্ত রূপের কল্পনা করা হইলে আর কোন কারণ থাকেনা এবং কারণহীন এই কল্পনা অসঙ্গত]

Eng. Trans. Conception of form in a form which is devoid of the cause of form, becomes illogical. So for the fallacy of causelessness, the conception of a form, devoid of cause of form, is not proper.

Candrakīrti—तस्मादहेतुकत्वदोषप्रसङ्गान्न रूपकारणनिर्म्मुक्तं रूपमभ्युपेतव्यम् ।

इदानीं रूपेणापि विनिर्म्मुक्तं यथा रूपकारणं नास्ति तथा प्रतिपादयन्नाह—

रूपेण तु विनिर्मुक्तं यदि स्याद्रूपकारणम् ।
अकार्यकं कारणं स्यात्, नास्त्यकार्यञ्च कारणम् ॥३॥

Beng. Trans. যদি কার্য্যরূপবিনির্মুক্ত রূপকারণ স্বীকার করা হয় তাহা হইলে কার্য্যহীন কারণ হইয়া পড়ে, কিন্তু কার্য্যহীন কারণ থাকিতে পারেনা।

[চতুর্ভূতব্যতিরিক্ত রূপকে স্বতঃ কারণ হিসাবে কল্পনা করিলে এই দোষ হয় যে, কারণ আছে অথচ কার্য্য নাই এবং কার্য্যহীন কারণ শশশৃঙ্গের ন্যায় অলীক]

Eng. Trans. If a form as cause is imagined without

any reference to form as effect, then a cause becomes effectless, but an effectless cause cannot exist.

Candrakīrti—अथ रूपस्य कारणमिष्यमाणं सति वा रूपकारणत्वेनेष्यते असति वा। उभयथा च नोपपद्यते इत्याह—

रूपे सत्येव रूपस्य कारणं नोपपद्यते।
रूपेऽसत्येव रूपस्य कारणं नोपपद्यते ॥४॥

Beng. Trans. রূপ থাকিলে রূপের কারণ উপপন্ন হয় না (প্রয়োজনের অভাবে)। আর রূপ না থাকিলে রূপের কারণ অপ্রাসঙ্গিক। (কারণ, কার্য্য না থাকিলে কারণ-কল্পনার প্রসঙ্গ কোথায়?)

Eng. Trans. The conception of cause of form becomes improper both in cases of existence and non-existence of form.

কার্য্য রূপ আছে বলিয়া কারণও হইবে। তাহা হইতে পারে যদি কার্য্য রূপ থাকে, কিন্তু ইহা নাই—

कार्यं रूपं विद्यते तत्सद्भावात् कारणमपि भविष्यतीति। स्यादेवं यदि कार्यं रूपं स्यान्न तु अस्ति, यस्मात्—

निष्कारणं पुना रूपं नैव नैवोपपद्यते।
(तस्मात्)रूपगतान् कांश्चिन्न विकल्पान् विकल्पयेत् ॥५॥

Beng. Trans. কারণাভাবে নির্হেতুক 'কার্য্য রূপ' হইতে পারে না। অতএব কোন তত্ত্বদর্শী পুরুষ (সপ্রতিঘ, অপ্রতিঘ, সনিদর্শন, অনিদর্শন প্রভৃতি) কোন রূপের অবলম্বনকে পরিকল্পনা করিতে পারে না।

Eng. Trans. (In the absence of cause) A causeless form (as effect) is not possible. Therefore no person with

philosophical foresight should conceive of form as obstructed (Sapratigha), unobstructed (Apratigha) etc.

Candrakīrti—अपि चेदं रूपकारणमिष्यमाणं सदृशं कार्यं निष्पादयेत् असदृशं वा, उभयथा च नोपपद्यते—इत्याह—

न कारणस्य सदृशं कार्यमित्युपपद्यते ।
न कारणस्यासदृशं कार्यमित्युपपद्यते ॥६॥

Beng. Trans. कार्य्य कारणेर सदृश (न्याय) अथवा कारणेर असदृश बला चले ना ।

Eng. Trans. An effect is neither like the cause nor unlike the cause.

Candrakīrti—न चापि सदृशानां शालिबीजादीनां परस्परं कार्यकारणभावो दृष्टः इत्यतो न कारणस्य सदृशं कार्यमित्युपपद्यते । न चापि कारणस्यासदृशं कार्यमित्युपपद्यते भिन्नलक्षणत्वान्निर्वाणवदेवेत्यभिप्रायः ।

यथा चेदं रूपं विचार्यमाणं सर्वथा नोपपद्यते एवं वेदनादयोऽपीति अतिदिशन्नाह—

वेदनाचित्तसंज्ञानां संस्काराणां च सर्वशः ।
सर्वेषामेव भावानां रूपेणैव समः क्रमः ॥७॥

Beng. Trans. वेदना, चित्त, संज्ञा, संस्कार प्रभृति सकल भावपदार्थेर सिद्धि रूपेर सिद्धिर न्याय आलोचनायोग्य ।

Eng. Trans. The non-existence of other socalled existing things as feelings (Vedanā), consciousness (Saṁjñā) etc. may be proved by applying the same sort of logic.

Candrakīrti—यथैव हि एकस्य धर्मस्य शून्यता प्रतिपादयितुमिष्टा माध्यमिकेन तथैव सर्वधर्माणामपीति। अतः—

विग्रहे यः परीहारं कृते शून्यतया वदेत्।
सर्वन्तस्यापरिहृतं समं साध्येन जायते ॥८॥

Beng. Trans. शून्यताव माध्यमे परपक्षदूषणादि प्रदर्शन करिया रूपेर स्वभावहीनता येरूप स्थापित हइयाछे सेइरूप साध्य रूपेर न्याय अन्यान्य वेदनादिर निःस्वभावत्व बुझिते हइबे।

Eng. Trans. The non-existence of other things as feeling etc. may be proved like the non-existence of Rūpa (form) which has been proved through the medium of voidness (Śūnyatā).

Candrakīrti—यथा रूपं स्वकारणात्तत्त्वान्यत्वेन विचार्यमाणमसदेव स्पर्शप्रत्यया वेदनाविज्ञानसहजासंज्ञा अविद्याप्रत्ययाः संस्काराः संस्कारप्रत्ययश्च विज्ञानं स्वकारणात् स्पर्शादेस्तत्त्वान्यत्वादिना विचार्यमाणं नास्तीति सर्वमेतत् साध्यसमं भवति।

यथा परपक्षदूषणे विहितोयं विधिरेवं व्याख्यानकालेपीत्याह—

व्याख्याने य उपालम्भः कृते शून्यतया वदेत्।
सर्वं तस्यानुपालब्धं समं साध्येन जायते ॥९॥

Beng. Trans. (शास्त्र प्रभृति) व्याख्यार समय (शब्दस्वरूप) ये कल्पना प्रभृति कृत हय शून्यताव एই विधि प्रयोग करिया এই সমস্ত শব্দাত্মক কল্পনার ও অসিদ্ধত্ব প্রমাণিত হয়, কারণ তাহারা সকলেই সাধ্যরূপের ন্যায় বলিয়া বুঝিতে হইবে।

Eng. Trans. Even it can be shown that the imaginations and other conceptions in the form of words which are done at the time of explaining all these things (to the students by the teachers) are also non-existent if judged in the light of voidness (Śūnyatā).

धातुपरीक्षा नाम पञ्चम-प्रकरणम्

Candrakīrti—षड् धातवः पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशविज्ञानाख्याः। तत्राकाशमधिकृत्योच्यते दूषणं स्वरूपविरूपणात्—

नाकाशं विद्यते किञ्चित् पूर्वमाकाशलक्षणात्।
अलक्षणं प्रसज्येत स्यात् पूर्वं यदि लक्षणात् ॥१॥

Beng. Trans. (অনাবরণরূপ) আকাশের লক্ষণের পূর্ব্বে আকাশ বলিয়া কিছু থাকিতে পারে না। যদি লক্ষণের পূর্ব্বে আকাশ থাকে তাহা হইলে সেই আকাশ (লক্ষণের পূর্ব্বে স্থিত বলিয়া) লক্ষণহীন হইয়া পড়ে।

Eng. Trans. Ether (sky) cannot exist before its characteristics. If it exists before the existence of its characteristics, then it becomes devoid of characteristics.

अलक्षणो न कश्चिच्च भावः संविद्यते क्वचित्।
असत्यलक्षणे भावे क्रमतां कुत्र लक्षणम् ॥२॥

Beng. Trans. লক্ষণহীন কোন ভাব পদার্থ থাকিতে পারে না। আর লক্ষণশূন্য ভাব না থাকিলে লক্ষণ কোথায় প্রবর্ত্তিত হইবে ?

Eng. Trans. An object, devoid of its characteristics cannot exist. Again if an object lacking in its characteristics does not exist, then, what is the place where the characteristics will be applied?

नालक्षणे लक्षणस्य प्रवृत्ति र्न सलक्षणे।
सलक्षणालक्षणाभ्यां नाप्यन्यत्र प्रवर्त्तते ॥३॥

Beng. Trans. লক্ষণহীন ভাবপদার্থে (শশশৃঙ্গের ন্যায়) লক্ষণের প্রবৃত্তি হয় না—লক্ষণযুক্ত পদার্থেও পুনরায় লক্ষণের প্রয়োজনাভাবে প্রবৃত্তি সম্ভবপর নয়—আর লক্ষণ ও অলক্ষণ হইতে ভিন্নস্থলে লক্ষণ প্রবৃত্ত হইতে পারে না।

Eng. Trans. Characteristics are not applied to an object devoid of them or possessing them, nor can thay be applicable in a case outside the two (one possessing characteristics and one not possessing it).

लक्षणासम्प्रवृत्तौ च न लक्ष्यमुपपद्यते।
लक्ष्यस्यानुपपत्तौ च लक्षणस्याप्यसम्भवः ॥४॥

Beng. Trans. লক্ষণের প্রবৃত্তি না হইলে লক্ষ্য সিদ্ধ হয় না।

লক্ষ্যের অনুপপত্তিতে লক্ষণও সম্ভবপর হয় না (নিরাশ্রয় বলিয়া) [অতএব লক্ষ্য ও লক্ষণ নাই]।

Eng. Trans. If the characteristics are not applied, an object cannot be proved to exist. In the absence of the object, characteristics are also not possible.

तस्मान्न विद्यते लक्ष्यं लक्षणं नैव विद्यते ।
लक्ष्यलक्षणनिर्मुक्तो नैव भावोऽपि विद्यते ॥५॥

Beng Trans. লক্ষ্য ও লক্ষণ যখন নাই তখন লক্ষ্য ও লক্ষণরহিত কোন (আকাশরূপ) ভাবপদার্থ থাকিতে পারে না। (আকাশ তাহা হইলে অভাব পদার্থ হউক, তাহার উত্তরে বলা হইয়াছে) ভাব যদি না থাকে তাহা হইলে কাহার অভাব হইবে ? (ভাবের অন্যথাভাবকেই অভাব বলা হয়)।

Eng. Trans. Therefore characteristics and object of characteristics do not exist and in their absence no object can exist.

अविद्यमाने भावे च कस्याभावो भविष्यति ।
भावाभावविधर्मा च भावाभावमवैति कः ॥६॥

Beng. Trans. ভাব না থাকিলে অভাব কাহার সম্পর্কে স্থিরীকৃত হইবে। আর ভাব ও অভাব ব্যতিরিক্ত তৃতীয়ধর্ম্ম এমন কোন পদার্থ আছে বলিয়া কে জানে ?

Eng. Trans. If the object does not exist, whose negation can be asserted? And who else knows of any object outside 'bhāva' and 'abhāva'?

तस्मान्न भावो नाभावो न लक्ष्यं नापि लक्षणम्।
(आकाशम्) आकाशसमा धातवः पञ्च ये परे ॥७॥

Beng. Trans. অতএব ভাব, অভাব, লক্ষ্য, লক্ষণ কিছুই নাই। আর অন্য আকাশব্যতিরিক্ত পঞ্চধাতুর বিচার অনুরূপ ভাবেই করা যাইতে পারে।

Eng. Trans. Thus an existing object, a non-existing one, object of characteristics and characteristics itself donot exist. The cases of other five elements may be proved in the same way.

अस्तित्वं ये तु पश्यन्ति नास्तित्वं चाल्पबुद्धयः।
भावनां ते न पश्यन्ति द्रष्टव्योपशमं शिवम् ॥८॥

Beng. Trans. যে সকল স্বল্পবুদ্ধিযুক্ত ব্যক্তি ভাবপদার্থের অস্তিত্ব ও নাস্তিত্ব বিচার করেন তাহারা (সর্ব্বকল্পনাজাল রহিত জ্ঞানজ্ঞেয় নিবৃত্তি স্বভাবাত্মক) পরমার্থকে জানিতে পারেন না।

Eng. Trans. Persons of meagre intelligence, who discuss the existence and non existence of objects, become unable to know the real nature of truth.

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

Unfortunately several misprints have crept into the book. I propose to revise them thoroughly in the next edition.

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